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IMPLEMENTING COMMISSION-BASED
SENTENCING GUIDELINES: THE LESSONS OF
THE FIRST TEN YEARS IN MINNESOTA
Richard S. Fraset
INTRODUCTION
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, in effect since 1980,'
represent a pioneering effort to reduce judicial and parolerelease discretion, provide more uniform and proportional
punishment, and prevent prison over-crowding. Minnesota was
the first state to use an independent state sentencing commission to draft and implement presumptive guidelines, and it was
also the first jurisdiction to enact state-wide controls over both
prison duration and prison commitment decisions. Congress
and several other states subsequently adopted similar commission-based, presumptive sentencing reforms. Nevertheless,
Minnesota's experience remains important because its Guidelines have been in effect the longest and have been extensively
studied and evaluated. The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines
Commission has routinely collected a large amount of data on
all felony sentences, as well as additional, even more detailed
data for selected samples.2 This rich source of data and com-

t Benjamin N. Berger Professor of Criminal Law, University of Minnesota.
A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of
the American Society of Criminology, San Francisco, November 1991.
'The current version of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines can be found
in MINN. R. OF CT. §§ I-V (West 1992) and in MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244 (West
1992 & Supp. 1993).
2 The Commission compiled two pre-Guidelines datasets based on 1978
cases, one examining the use of executed prison terms, the other dealing with
the duration of such terms (i.e., time served prior to first release on parole).
MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMIN, THE IMPACT OF THE MINNESOTA

SENTENCING GUIDELINES: THREE YEAR EVALUATION 20 (1984) [hereinafter
THREE YEAR EVALUATION]. Starting in 1981, the Commission compiled postGuidelines "evaluation" datasets for all felons sentenced in each year. Prior
to 1988, these datasets covered a "yea" running from November through
October (and designated by the later of the two years); starting in 1988, these
datasets cover a calendar year. The Commission has also compiled more detailed data on the use ofjail, fines, and other conditions of non-prison sentences, and on the sentencing of weapons and drug offenders. See, e.g., MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMN, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE ON
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE OFFENSES (1992); MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE ON INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS
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mentary, the extensive appellate case law interpreting the
Guidelines, and a decade of legislative and Commission-initiated
amendments contain essential lessons for reformers in other
jurisdictions. These lessons concern not only the process of
drafting and implementing a system of commission-based
presumptive sentences, but also the evolution of such a system
over an extended period of time.
The Commission and outside researchers published several
reports analyzing implementation efforts through 1984. 3 The

(1991); MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMIN, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE ON THE MANDATORY MINIMUM LAW FOR WEAPONS OFFENSES (1991).

Finally, the Commission compiled four "in depth" datasets for the years 1978,
1981, 1982, and 1984, containing detailed information on the "real" (versus
charged) offense, charging and plea bargaining, and offender demographics.
These datasets included only those defendants who were sentenced in eight
counties, containing about 60% of the state's population. THREE YEAR
EVALUATION, supra, at 19-20.
In addition to the reports cited above, the Commission has published
findings from the evaluation datasets in annual "data summaries." In the
remainder of this article, when statistical results are cited by year or dataset
only, rather than by publication, such findings are based on the author's own
analysis of the Commission's data, using the Statistical Package for the Social
Sciences (SPSS PC+ version 4.01).
3

E.g., THREE YEAR EVALUATION, supra note 2; DALE G. PARENT, STRUC-

TURING CRIMINAL SENTENCES: THE EVOLUTION OF MINNESOTA'S SENTENCING

GUIDELINES (1988), reviewed and partially updated by Richard S. Frase,
Sentencing Reform in Minnesota, Ten Years After: Reflections on Dale G.
Parent's Structuring Criminal Sentences: The Evolution of Minnesota's
Sentencing Guidelines, 75 MINN. L. REV. 727 (1991); Debra L. Dailey, The
Sentencing of Sex Offenders Under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines: Is
There a Need for Change? 10 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POLY 193 (1990); Kay A.
Knapp, Proactive Policy Analysis of Minnesota's PrisonPopulations,1 CRIM.
JUST. POLY REV. 37 (1986); Kay A. Knapp, What Sentencing Reform in
Minnesota Has and Has Not Accomplished, 68 JUDICATURE 181 (1984);
Terance D. Miethe, Chargingand Plea BargainingPractices Under Determinate Sentencing: An Investigationof the HydraulicDisplacementof Discretion,
78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 155 (1987); Terance D. Miethe & Charles A.
Moore, Socioeconomic Disparities Under Determinate Sentencing Systems: A
Comparison of Preguideline and Postguideline Practices in Minnesota, 23
CRIMINOLOGY 337 (1985) [hereinafter Miethe & Moore, Socioeconomic Disparities]; Charles A. Moore & Terance D. Miethe, Regulated and Unregulated
Sentencing Decisions: An Analysis of First-YearPractices Under Minnesota's
Felony Sentencing Guidelines, 20 LAw & SOc'Y REV. 253 (1986); Symposium,
DeterminantSentencing, 5 HAMLINE L. REV. 161 (1982) (articles and casenotes
on Minnesota Guidelines); Terance D. Miethe & Charles A. Moore, Can Sentencing Reform Work? A Four-Year Evaluation of Determinate Sentencing in
Minnesota (1987) (unpublished paper presented at the 1987 Annual Meeting
of the American Society of Criminology) [hereinafter Miethe & Moore, Four-
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purpose of this article is to present the most important data
through 1989, compare these findings to those of earlier studies,
and assess the long-term successes and failures of this important reform effort. The most recent year for which complete
sentencing data were available as of this writing is 1989, and it
was also a "watershed" year which saw major changes in the
Guidelines, the enabling statute, and the state's criminal code.4
Further significant statutory changes were enacted in 1990,
1991, and 1992. Since the 1989 changes applied to crimes
committed on or after August 1st of that year, they only governed about 5% of the cases included in the calendar-year 1989
dataset, but they will dramatically affect data for subsequent
years and may cause serious problems of comparability with
earlier years.5 Thus, 1989 provides a natural stopping point at
which to take stock of the evolution and accomplishments of the
Minnesota Guidelines.
Part I of the article briefly summarizes the 1978 enabling
statute, the initial 1980 Guidelines and subsequent amendments, important statutory changes since 1978, and the most
significant appellate case law. Parts II through IV assess the
extent to which the Guidelines appear to have achieved each of
their major goals,6 namely: (1) greater uniformity in the use of
state prison sentences, with particular emphasis on preventing
racial, gender, and social class disparities; (2) increasedproportionality of prison commitment rates and durations, relative to
the Guidelines Commission's offense severity rankings and
other normative choices; and (3) avoidance of prison and jail
overcrowding. Several other declared or apparent goals of the
Minnesota Guidelines will also be addressed from time to time,
namely: (4) honesty ("truth in sentencing"), particularly with
respect to the relationship between the sentence pronounced
and the sentence actually served;' (5) simplicity in the GuideYear Evaluation].
4
See infra part I.
5
For example, the criminal history weighting scheme, described infra text
accompanying note 42, can shift a given case several cells to the right or left
in the Guidelines matrix.
6 See MINN. R. OF CT. § I (Statement of Purpose and Principles); THREE
YEAR EVALUATION, supra note 2, at v, 1, 3; MINNESOTA SENTENCING GuIDELINES COMM'N, REPORT To THE LEGISLATURE 2-3, 13-14 (1980).

See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING CoMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1(A)(3)
(1991); MINNESOTA LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONAL
POLICIES 75 (1991).
7
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lines' definitions and application; 8 (6) "parsimony" (insuring
that sentences are the least restrictive necessary to achieve the
purposes of the sentence);9 and (7) Commission control over
state-wide sentencingpolicy (to make such policy more coordinated and less subject to short-term political pressures).'0
This study concludes that the Minnesota Guidelines have
achieved, and continue to achieve, most of the goals summarized
above. They have been modestly successful in achieving greater
honesty and uniformity in sentencing, and very successful in
promoting parsimonious use of prison sentences and in preventing prison and jail overcrowding. They give judges and other
officials substantial but not unlimited discretion, and still
remain fairly simple to apply. Despite some legislative encroachments, the Guidelines Commission retains primary
control over the setting of statewide sentencing policy. However, the Commission's efforts to effect certain prescriptive changes in the choice of who goes to prison were relatively unsuccessful, even in the early years.
I. EVOLUTION OF MINNESOTA SENTENCING LAW
SINCE 1980

A. THE ENABLING STATUTE AND INITIAL GUIDELINES
The broad outlines of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines
were laid down in the 1978 statute creating the Guidelines
Commission." Parole release was abolished, and was replaced
with a specified reduction (up to one-third off) for good behavior
in prison. 2 The new commission was directed to promulgate
guidelines regulating both the decision to impose state imprisonment and the duration of such imprisonment, based on
"reasonable offense and offender characteristics," while taking
into "substantial consideration" two factors: "current sentencing
and releasing practices" and "correctional resources, including

8 See MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES CoMMN, supra note 6, at 7;

PARENT, supra note 3, at 53 n.3, 58 n.8, 71.
9 MINN. R. OF CT.

§ 1(3);

see NORVAL MORRIs, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISON-

MENT 59-62 (1974).
10 See Frase, supra note 3, at 729-30.
11
Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 723, 1978 Minn.Laws 761 (codified as amended
at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993)).
1 Id. § 4 (codified at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.04(1) (West Supp. 1993)).
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but not limited to the capacities of local and state correctional
facilities. 13 The Commission was also permitted (but not
required) to develop guidelines regulating the conditions of nonprison sentences. The 1978 statute further provided that
earned good time reductions would constitute a period of paroletype post-release supervision known as the Supervised Release
Term;14 the statute also implied that denial of good time reductions could only be based on disciplinary violations, not failure
to participate in or cooperate with in-prison treatment programs
(since all such programs were to become voluntary). 5 Finally,
sentencing judges were directed to provide written reasons
when they departed from the new guidelines," and both defendants and the prosecution were given the right to appeal any
sentence (whether or not it was a departure). 7
Pursuant to this statutory mandate, the Sentencing Guidelines Commission promulgated a set of guidelines represented
by the matrix shown in Figure 1, with offense severity on the
vertical axis and the defendant's criminal history score on the
horizontal axis. 8 Offenders with low to medium criminal
history scores, convicted of lower severity offenses were to
receive a stayed (suspended) prison term of a specified number
of months; for more serious offenses or criminal history scores,
the presumptive sentence was an executed prison term within
a narrow specified range (e.g., 30 to 34 months). The boundary
between presumptive stayed and presumptive executed prison
terms was shown on the matrix by a heavy black line known as
the "disposition line." Cases above the line had presumptive
stayed sentences, except for a few cases involving a dangerous
weapon or repeat sex offender, which were subject to mandatory
minimum prison terms under existing state statutes. Additional rules specified when consecutive prison sentences could be
imposed, listed permissible and impermissible bases for departure from presumptive disposition and durational rules, and
suggested (but did not regulate) a wide variety of possible

'3 Id. § 9 (codified at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.09(5) (2) (West 1992)).
14 Id. § 9 (codified at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.09(1) (West Supp. 1993)).
15 Id. §§ 2-3 (codified at MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 244.02-.03 (West 1992 &
Supp. 1993)).
16 Id.

§ 10 (codified at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.10(2) (West 1992)).

7 Id. §
18

11 (codified at MINN. STAT. ANN.

§ 244.11 (West 1992)).

MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES CoMM'N, supra note 6,

at 38.
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FIGURE 1
Original Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Grid
Effective May 1, 1980

Presumptive Sentence Lengths in Months
Italicized numbers within the grid denote the range within which a
judge may sentence without the sentence being deemed a departure.
CRIMINAL HISTORY SCORE

SEVERITY LEVELS OF
CONVICTION OFFENSE

0

1

I-4:5I1or

2

or

more

Unauthorized Use of
I
Motor Vehicle
Possession of Marijuana

12"

12*

12*

15

18

21

24

Theft Related Crimes
($150-$2500)
Sale of Marijuana

II

12*

12*

14

17

20

23

27
25-29

Theft Crimes
($150-$2500)

III

12*

13

16

19

22
21-23

27
25-29

32
30-34

Burglary - Felony Intent
IV
Receiving Stolen
Goods ($150-$2500)

12*

15

18

21

25
24-26

32
30-34

41
37-45

18

23

27

30
29-31

38
36-40

46
43-49

54
50-58

21

26

30

34
33-35

44
42-46

54
54
50-58

65
6
60-70

Simple Robbery

V

Assault, 2nd Degree

VI

Aggravated Robbery

VII

Assault, 1st Degree

24

32

41

49

65

81

97

23-25

30-34

38-44

45-53

60-70

75-87

90-104

43
Vill41-45

54
50-58

65
60-70

95

113

132

71-81

76

Criminal Sexual
Coimn ,
Dexual

VIII

Murder, 3rd Degree

IX

230
205
176
149
127
119
97
94-100 116-122 124-130 143-155 168-184 195-215 218-242

Murder, 2nd Degree

X

324
284
243
203
162
140
116
111-121 133-147 153-171 192-214 231-255 270-298 309-339

Conduct, 1st Degree

89-101 106-120 124-140

Under state statutes, 1st Degree Murder has a mandatory life sentence.
* one year and one day
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conditions of stayed prison sentences. Such conditions can
include up to one year of confinement in a local jail or workhouse, supervised or unsupervised probation, fines, restitution,
treatment, and community service. 9
The Commission announced that its new rules were not
merely descriptive of prior practice, but were rather "prescripnorm-changing, not merely norm-reinforcing. For
tive":20
example, the severity ranking of offenses was based on the
Commission's own consensus as to the seriousness of individual
crimes," and the Guidelines criminal history scale included a
point for prior misdemeanor convictions, which had not figured
heavily in previous judicial and correctional practices.2 2 Overall, the Commission stated that it was adopting "just deserts" as
the primary sentencing goal, and that its new Guidelines were
intended to reserve scarce prison space for violent offenders
(even first offenders) rather than repeat property offenders.23
B. MAJOR GUIDELINES AND STATUTORY CHANGES
FROM

1980 TO 1988

The most important changes made by the Guidelines Commission itself from 1980 to 1988 involved the durations of
presumptive prison terms:' durations at severity levels one to
19MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.135(1) (West Supp. 1993). In felony cases the

duration of a stayed sentence (and thus, the length of probation) may be any
period up to the maximum prison term that could have been imposed, or three
years, whichever is longer. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.135(2) (a) (West Supp.
1993).
'o THREE YEAR EVALUATION, supra note 2, at v, 8-10; MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N, supra note 6, at 3.
21
MINNESOTA SENTENCING GuIDELINES COMM'N, supra note 6, at 6-7.

' Id. at 7. The principal component of criminal history under the Guidelines - as under pre-Guidelines practice - is the number of prior felony
convictions. From 1980 until 1989, each felony counted one point; as of
August 1, 1989, prior felonies are weighted according to their seriousness. See
infra text accompanying note 42.
' TMEE YEAR EVALUATION, supra note 2, at 10-14; MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMN, supra note 6, at 9, 15.
' In addition, the disposition line was changed so that the upper righthand
cell (severity level one, criminal history six or more) is now a presumptive
executed prison sentence, not a stayed sentence (compare figures 1 and 2);
also, aggravating factors were added for drug crimes, violent crimes for hire,
and gang-related offenses. See KAY A. KNAPP, MINNESOTA SENTENCING
GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY ANNOTATED 61-61A (1985 & Supp. 1992).
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FIGURE 2

Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Grid
Effective August 1, 1987 through July 31, 1989
Presumptive Sentence Lengths in Months

Italicized numbers within the grid denote the range within which a
judge may sentence without the sentence being deemed a departure.
CRIMINAL HISTORY SCORE
SEVERITY LEVELS OF
CONVICTION OFFENSE

Unauthorized Use of
I
Motor Vehicle
Possession of Marijuana
Theft Related Crimes
($2500 or less)
Check Forgery
($200-$2500)
Theft Crimes
($2500 or less)

12*

12*

12*

13

15

17

II

12*

12,

13

15

17

19

III

12-

13

I5

17

Nonresidential Burglary
Theft Crimes
IV

12*

15

i8

21

(over $2500)

Residential Burglary

V

Simple Robbery

Criminal Sexual
Conduct. 2nd Degree

VI

18

2

27

21

26

30

(a) & (b)
Aggravated Robbery

VII

19
18-20
21
20-22

19

22

25

18-20

21-23

24-26

25

32

41

24-26

30-34

37-45

30

38

46

54

29-31

3640

43-49

50-58

34

44

54

65

33-35

42-46

50-58

60-70

24

32

41

49

65

81

97

23-25

30-34

38-44

45-53

60-70

75-87

90-104

Criminal Sexual Conduct
VIII 43
1st Degree
41-45
Assault. 1st Degree

54

65

76

95

113

132

50-58

60-70

71-81

119

127

149

Murder, 3rd Degree

IX

Murder, 2nd Degree

105

89-101 106-120 124-140

176

205

230

102-108 116-122 124-130 143-155 168-184 195-215 218-242

(felony murder)
Murder, 2nd Degree
(with intent)

X

216

236

256

276

296

316

336

212-220 231-241 250-262 269-283 288-304 307-325 326-346

Under state statutes, 1st Degree Murder has a mandatory life sentence.
* one year and one day
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three, with medium to high criminal history, were lowered by
from one to seven months, in order to stay within prison capacity limits;2 5 durations in certain cells at severity levels nine and
ten were increased by from eight to 100 months. Figure 2
shows the Guidelines grid immediately prior to August 1, 1989.
These are the rules which governed almost all sentences in the
1989 dataset, which is the most recent sentencing period discussed in detail in this article.
Major legislative changes from 1980 through 1988 included
the following: (1) in 1981 the statute requiring a mandatory
minimum prison term for use of a dangerous weapon was
amended to increase terms for use of a firearm, increase the
number of offenses to which the statute applies, and authorize
courts to depart from the mandatory minimum prison term on
the prosecutor's motion. (2) Also in 1981, the separate offense
of Intrafamilial Sexual Abuse (IFSA) was created, paralleling
the existing Criminal Sexual Conduct statutes but with a
provision that the court may impose a stayed prison sentence if
it finds that this is "in the best interest of the complainant or
the family unit."27 In 1985, further requirements for such
stayed sentences were added: a "professional assessment" must
indicate that the offender "has been accepted by and can respond to a treatment program," and the court must order
defendant to complete the program and spend some period of
time in jail. (3) In 1987, the legislature added a similar "amenable to treatment" provision to the statute imposing a mandatory minimum prison term on repeat sex offenders.2 8

THREE YEAR EVALUATION, supra note 2, at 91-92.
In 1982 the Supreme Court ruled that the trial court may also depart on
its own motion. State v. Olson, 325 N.W.2d 13 (Minn. 1982).
27 Law of May 28, 1981, ch. 273, §§ 7-11, 1981 Minn. Laws 1236, 1239-43
(repealed 1985). This statute was replaced by similarly-worded provisions in
the regular Criminal Sexual Conduct statutes. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 609.342(1) (g) (3) (West Supp. 1993) (stay authorized for certain first degree
offenders with a "significant relationship" to the complainant).
2 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.346(2) (West Supp. 1993); see also State v.
Feinstein, 338 N.W.2d 244 (Minn. 1983) (holding that trial courts still have
authority to grant probation in cases covered by this mandatory minimum
statute, provided they comply with Guidelines requirements for a mitigated
dispositional departure).
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C. CASE LAW

Most of the major appellate case law interpreting the
Guidelines was decided in the first two years after they became
effective, and thus was controlled entirely by the Minnesota
Supreme Court. (The intermediate-level Minnesota Court of
Appeals did not begin issuing opinions until February, 1984).
The Supreme Court almost immediately established the principle that sentencing should be based on the conviction offense,
and should not be based on the details of offenses dismissed or
never filed (so-called "real offense" sentencing).29 The court
also established that departures could not be based on assessments of the individual defendant's dangerousness," nor on
special needs for deterrence, 31 nor on factors such as the absence of criminal history, which had already been taken into
account in drafting the guidelines (criminal history "redundancy"). 32 The court also ruled, in State v. Evans,33 that upward

durational departures should normally not exceed twice the
presumptive duration (although, in very exceptional cases, the
court may depart all the way up to the statutory maximum).
THREE YEAR EVALUATION, supra note 2, at 111-13; cf. United States v.
Galloway, 976 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied, No. 92-6911,
1993 U.S. LEXIS 2015 (Mar. 8, 1993) (upholding trial court's power to impose
a sentence three times longer than the Federal Sentencing Guidelines presumptive term, based on uncharged "relevant conduct"). However, real-offense
sentencing is still permitted in limited situations, under the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines: (1) Defendants are subject to mandatory minimum
prison terms if they commit certain offenses with a dangerous weapon, even
though most of the eligible offenses do not include use of such a weapon as an
element of the crime. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.11(4) (West 1992); (2) Some
offense severity rankings depend on dollar amounts of loss which are not
elements of the conviction offense. See MINN. R. OF CT. § V (Theft and Theft
Related Offenses); (3) Upward departures may be based on aggravating factors
which are not elements of the conviction offense (e.g., particular vulnerability
of victim), and which may not even be part of the same course of conduct
charged (e.g., "major economic offense" by defendant involved in other, similar
conduct as evidenced by findings of prior civil, administrative, or disciplinary
proceedings). Id. § II(D) (2) (b) (1), 4(e); see also State v. Garcia, 302 N.W.2d
29

643 (Minn. 1981) (upholding upward departure based on unconvicted crimes

which defendant had admitted on the record, and which were part of the same
course of conduct as the offenses to which he pled guilty).
'0 State v. Hagen, 317 N.W.2d 701, 703 (Minn. 1982).
31 State v. Schmit, 329 N.W.2d 56, 58 n.1 (Minn. 1983).
32
THREE YEAR EVALUATION, supra note 2, at 121, 124.
33

311 N.W.2d 481 (Minn. 1981).
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Trial court decisions not to depart were largely insulated from
appellate scrutiny by the Court's statement in State v.
Kindem3 4 that "[although] we do not intend to entirely close
the door... it would be a rare case which would warrant reversal of the refusal to depart."
In another very significant line of cases, the court held that
dispositional departures (but not durational departures) may be
based on individualized assessments of the offender's "amenability" to probation or prison. 5 State v. Park36 upheld an
upward dispositional departure (commitment to prison, rather
than the presumptive stayed term) based on the defendant's
unamenability to probation; State v. Wright 7 upheld a downward dispositional departure based on findings that the defendant was unusually vulnerable and was therefore unamenable
to prison, and that he was particularly amenable to treatment
in a probationary setting. State v. Trog 8 upheld a downward
dispositional departure based solely on the defendants particular amenability to probation, emphasizing the aberrational and
uncharacteristic nature of the defendant's crime, rather than
any particular treatment needs. Another important decision
related to dispositional departures was State v. Randolph, 9
which held that courts must grant a defendant's request for
execution of the presumptive stayed prison term when the trial
court's proposed conditions of the stay are so onerous that they
would be more severe than the prison term.
Finally, the court held in State v. Hernandez, ° that criminal history points may accrue on a single day when defendants
are sentenced concurrently for more than one offense. For
example, a defendant with no previous convictions who was
sentenced concurrently on four separate burglary counts would
have a criminal history of three by the time he was sentenced

313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981).
' These cases are discussed at length in Frase, supra note 3, at 740-48. A
very similar line of cases, under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, is
discussed in Richard S. Frase, DefendantAmenability to Treatment orProbation as a Basis for Departure Under the Minnesota and Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 3 FED. SENTENCING REP. 328 (1991).
36 305 N.W.2d 775 (Minn. 1981).
37 310 N.W.2d 461 (Minn. 1981).
3

38 323 N.W.2d 28 (Minn. 1982).
39 316 N.W.2d 508 (Minn. 1982).
40 311 N.W.2d 478 (Minn. 1981).
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on the fourth count. Prior to Hernandez, prosecutors could
threaten to serialize prosecutions to achieve the same result,
and all additional concurrent counts would increase the defendant's future criminal history if he committed further offenses,
but Hernandez sentencing increases the immediate impact (and
plea-bargaining leverage) of multiple counts. The Hernandez
rule also helps prosecutors target "high-rate" offenders, and
thus further emphasizes the utilitarian (incapacitative) rather
than retributive purposes of the criminal history score under the
Guidelines. However, utilitarian goals clearly were already
present. Under the original Guidelines, "prior" felony and
misdemeanor convictions were counted as of the date of sentencing, rather than as of the date of the current offense, which
would be required under a purely retributive model.4
D. MAJOR GUIDELINES AND STATUTORY CHANGES
SINCE 1989

As of August 1, 1989, the Guidelines Commission substantially increased the durations of sentences at severity levels
seven through ten (compare Figures 2 and 3); changes at levels
seven and eight were the Commission's idea; those at levels
nine and ten were mandated by the Legislature (see below). In
addition, the Commission adopted the following criminal history
weighting scheme for prior felony convictions:
(1) prior convictions at levels 1 and 2 = one-halfpoint
each;
(2) convictions at levels 3, 4 and 5 = one point each;
(3) convictions at levels 6 and 7 = one and a halfpoints
each;
(4) convictions
at levels 8, 9 and 10 = two points
42
each.

41 See PARENT, supra note 3, at 163.
42

The Commission also for the first time added a new mitigating factor to
its list, applicable to cases in which the defendant is found guilty at levels one
through four and all of his or her prior felony sentences were imposed in one
or two court appearances (which often occurs in the case of closely-related
offenses or crime "sprees"). MINN. R. OF CT. § II(D) (2) (a) (4). At the same
time, the Commission added another aggravating factor, applicable to certain
sex offenses. Id. § II(D) (2) (b) (3).
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FIGURE 3
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Grid
Effective August 1, 1989

Presumptive Sentence Lengths in Months
Italicized numbers within the grid denote the range within which a
judge may sentence without the sentence being deemed a departure.
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Under state statutes, 1st Degree Murder has a mandatory life sentence.
* one year and one day
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Not satisfied with the Commission's proposed prison duration increases at severity levels 7 and 8, the 1989 Minnesota43
Legislature adopted a large number of "get tough" measures.
Certain first-degree murderers became eligible for life without
parole; other recidivist murderers and sex offenders received
mandatory statutory-maximum terms; minimum prison terms
were specified for certain drug crimes; and other violent and sex
crimes received increased statutory maxima. In addition, the
Legislature amended the Guidelines' enabling statute to specify
that the Commission's "primary" consideration in setting guidelines should be public safety; the availability of correctional
resources remains a factor, but is no longer to be taken into
"substantial" consideration. The Commission also was directed
to increase the presumptive prison terms for Severity level 9
and 10 offenders by specified amounts, and to add a specified
item to the Guidelines' list of aggravating factors justifying
departure. "
The 1989 Crime Bill also gave judges and correctional
authorities greater discretion both to aggravate and to mitigate
the Guidelines' terms: judges could impose the statutory maximum prison term in certain cases,' apparently without meeting the ordinary standards for departure and degree of departure, but were also given explicit authorization to depart from
the new mandatory minimum prison terms for drug offenders,
where "a professional assessment indicates that the offender has
been accepted by and can respond to a treatment program."46
Judges could also authorize early release of sex offenders if the
Commissioner of Corrections found them "amenable" to treatment.47
In 1990 and 1991 the Legislature seemed to give further
endorsement to individualized assessments of dangerousness

" Act of June 1, 1989, ch. 290, 1989 Minn. Laws 1581 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of the Minnesota Statutes). The provisions of this crime
bill are discussed further in Frase, supranote 3, at 732-33, 749.
4 Act of June 1, 1989, art. 2, § 17, 1989 Minn. Laws at 1594; id. art. 3,
§ 25, 1989 Minn. Laws at 1605 (repealed 1991).
45
1Id. art. 2, § 9 (codified at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.152 (West Supp. 1993))
(dangerous and career offenders); art. 4, § 10, codified at MINN. STAT. ANN. §
609.1352 (West Supp. 1993)) (dangerous sex offenders).
46 Id. art 3, § 20 (codified at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 152.152 (West Supp.

1993)).
41 Id. art. 4, § 10(5) (codified at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.1352(5) (West
Supp. 1993)).
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and amenability to treatment. The 1990 Crime Bill' established a program of "intensive community supervision" (ICS)for
three offender groups: those on supervised release, those committed to custody after revocation of their stayed prison term,
and certain offenders with prison terms of 27 months or less.
The trial court must approve such release in the second and
third categories above, but the Commissioner of Corrections has
discretion to decide which eligibles to release in all three categories, and when to revoke such release. Individualized assessments of danger to public safety are implicit or explicit in all of
these decisions. The operation of ICS (e.g., caseloads, and
stages and degree of supervision) was strictly regulated by the
1990 statute, but the 1991 Crime Bill eliminated these restrictions (thereby restoring Department of Corrections discretion
and control), in the case of offenders on supervised release.4 9
The 1992 crime legislation continued many of the trends
described above. Although the principal crime bill did seek to
expand treatment, education, and social service programs, it
also contained "get tough" provisions for certain sex offenders:
mandatory doubling of Guidelines presumptive sentences,
lengthier supervised release terms, increased statutory maxima,
and mandatory life and 30-year prison terms.50 Another bill
5
substantially increased sentences for certain cocaine offenses. 1
Correctional discretion was increased by provisions allowing
officials to require prisoners to participate in sex offender
programs, discipline those who refuse, and remove "unamenable" prisoners from such programs.5 2 Discretion to grant early
4 Act of May 3, 1990, ch. 568, art. 2, §§ 31-36, 1990 Minn. Laws 1792
(codified as amended at MINN.STAT. ANN. §§ 241.26(2), 244.05,.12-.15 (West
1992)). The provisions of this bill are discussed further in Frase, supra note

3, at 749-51.
49 Act of May 31, 1991, ch. 258, 1991 Minn. Laws 920 (codified as amended
at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.12 (West 1992)).
oAct of Apr. 29, 1992, ch. 571, art. 1, §§ 11-12, 14-15, 22-25, 1992 Minn.
Laws 1990 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT ANN. §§ 609.1352, .342-43,
.346 (West Supp. 1993)); see also id. § 13 (mandating life without parole for
certain rape-murderers).
51
Act of Jan. 17, 1992, ch. 359, 1992 Minn. Laws 3 (codified as amended at
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 152.01, .021-.023, .025 (West Supp. 1993) (raising
penalties for powdered cocaine to equal those previously applicable to "crack,"
in response to a Minnesota Supreme Court decision, see State v. Russell, 477
N.W.2d 886, 888 (Minn. 1991), holding that the prior statutory distinction
between these two forms of cocaine violated the state constitution).
52Act of Apr. 29, 1992, ch. 571, art. 1, § 1, 1992 Minn. Laws 1984 (codified
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release to certain amenable sex offenders was eliminated, but
the Commissioner was given discretion to select other offenders
for early release to a new boot-camp ("challenge incarceration")
program5 3 (a development which seemed to herald the return
of the "P word" - parole). Finally, renewed interest in the goal
of "truth in sentencing" led to enactment of a provision reversing the procedure for applying "good time" credits: instead of
pronouncing a longer prison term which can later be reduced by
one-third, judges will henceforth pronounce a sentence equal to
two-thirds of the presumptive term, which can be lengthened for
misconduct in prison.'
E. SUMMARY
The case law, legislation, and Guidelines modifications summarized above show that the Minnesota Guidelines have
changed substantially over time, giving increased emphasis to
treatment and incapacitation goals, with more and more scope
for individualized assessments of offender amenability and
dangerousness (and thus, decreased emphasis on "Just Deserts"
and uniformity goals). This evolutionary process has also made
the Guidelines' rules and application more complex than they
once were, a trend which may be inherent in any regulatory
scheme. However, the Minnesota Guidelines are still fairly
simple to apply. Perhaps the most troubling development is the
recent tendency of the Legislature to take a more active role in
setting sentencing policy: enacting increasingly punitive penalties, without regard to available prison capacity or less punitive
alternatives; directing the Commission to make specific changes
in the Guidelines; and encouraging the exercise of judicial and
correctional discretion in some cases, while at the same time
enacting "mandatory" sentencing laws applicable to other cases.

as amended at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 241.67 (West Supp. 1993); Act of Apr. 29,
1992, ch. 571, art. 2, § 6, 1992 Minn. Laws 2005 (codified as amended at
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.01 (West Supp. 1993)).
" Id. art. 1, § 12 (codified at MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 241.67 (West Supp.
1993)); id. art. 11, §§ 5-8 (codified at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.05(1)(B) (West
Supp. 1993)).
' Id. art. 2, §§ 3-7 (codified at MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 244.04-.05, .101 (West
Supp. 1993)); see also id. § 8 (removing 40-year cap on consecutive sentences);
id. § 12 (directing the Commission to adopt presumptive consecutive sentences
for crimes committed by inmates); id. art 4, § 3 (mandatory minimum fines
equal to 20 percent of the statutory maximum fine).

19931

IMPLEMENTING SENTENCING GUIDELINES

295

The Guidelines Commission retains primary control over statewide sentencing policy, but no longer enjoys the relative monopoly (and insulation from public scrutiny and political pressures)
which it had in the early 1980s.
II. SENTENCING UNIFORMITY
The primary goal of the Minnesota Guidelines is to reduce
disparity in the imposition and duration of state prison sentences.5 5 The Minnesota Commission viewed disparity as having
two components: uniformity and proportionality. 56
Uniformity is achieved when similarly situated offenders
receive the same sentence, whether or not that is the "best"
(e.g., deserved or most "proportional") sentence. A particularly
important subsidiary goal is sentencing "neutrality" with respect
to the race, gender, and social or economic status of offenders.57 Of course, there is inevitably a normative component in
any definition of the factors that make two offenders "similarly
situated."" The Commission and pre ious researchers have
generally limited their analyses -to comparisons of defendants
sharing the same Guidelines severity level, criminal history
score, and presumptive disposition. However, as"shown below,
some of these groups contain sub-categories of offenders who are
consistently handled differently from each other.
. Proportionality in sentencing requires that severity of sanctions increase in direct proportion to increases in offense severity and relevant offender criteria. A key issue of proportionality
is whether courts and prosecutors accept, initially and over
time, the "prescriptive" changes sought to be imposed by the
Guidelines Commission. Again, the Commission and previous
researchers have generally assumed that Guidelines severity
level, criminal history score, and presumptive disposition are
the only factors relevant to proportionality.5 9

" Other forms of disparity, particularly in the conditions of stayed-prison
sentences and in prosecutorial charging and plea bargaining, are not addressed under the Guidelines.
56
TmEE YEAR EVALUATION, supra note 2, at 33.
5

7 Id.

at 61-69.

' Albert W. Alschuler, The Failureof Sentencing Guidelines: A Pleafor
Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 917-18 (1991).
" The Commission recognized that the goal of proportionality sometimes
requires departure from the presumptive sentence to reflect unusual aggra-

296 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 2:279

Uniformity is discussed in this part of the article, proportionality in the next. Although the principal focus is on Guidelines implementation in the years since 1984, which are not
covered by earlier published evaluations, attention must also be
given to some important limitations of those evaluations.

A. DEPARTURE RATES
The Guidelines Commission's principal measures of overall
sentencing uniformity and proportionality 0 have been the
rates of departure from presumptive prison commitment ("disposition") and prison duration rules. Dispositional departures can
be either "aggravated" or "mitigated," depending upon whether
the presumptive disposition was a stayed or an executed prison
sentence. Durational departures can also be either aggravated
or mitigated, and are usually reported separately for 1) executed
prison terms and 2) all prison terms, including both executed
and stayed sentences. Since most prison terms are stayed, and
most stays are never revoked, the remainder of this article will
focus only on the first of these two measures.
As shown in Figures 4 and 5, reported dispositional and
executed-prison durational departure rates fell dramatically in
1981, the first year of the Guidelines. 6 ' After 1981, the rates
for both types of durational departure, as well as those for
aggravated dispositional departures, remained fairly stable
through 1989. Mitigated dispositional departure rates rose

vating or mitigating circumstances of the case. However, such circumstances
have only been studied in two eight-county samples of 1981 and 1982 cases.
THREE YEAR EVALUATION, supra note 2, at 53-56.
0 Dispositional departure rates measure uniformity and proportionality
somewhat differently. Any increase in the departure rate implies reduced
proportionality, since it increases the likelihood that some of the departures
are not justified by "substantial and compelling circumstances." As to uniformity, however, increases in the dispositional departure rate only make
sentences less uniform within the range of 0% to 50%. Above 50%, further
increases make sentences more uniform, but less proportionate. An additional
measure of uniformity within cells, entitled "grid variance," was employed by
the Commission until 1983. See THREE YEAR EVALUATION, supra note 2, at
33-34.
61 Of course, since there were no presumptive sentences to "depart" from in
1978, "departure rates" for that year are only meaningful as a means of
comparing pre- and post-Guidelines sentences relative to the offense groupings
and other norms embodied in the Guidelines. Alschuler, supra note 58, at 917-
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FIGuRE 4
Reported Dispositional Departure Rates
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substantially through 1985, then levelled off at about 6%.
FIGURE 6
Adjusted Dispositional Departure Rates
(% of defendants eligible for each type)
1978 (estimated) and 1981-1989
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There are several problems with these official measures,
however, particularly with the mitigated dispositional departure
rates. The Guidelines Commission has generally computed
dispositional departure rates for each year as a percentage of
the total cases sentenced, but when aggravated and mitigated
dispositional departures rates are analyzed separately, it is
more meaningful to express the number of departures as a
percentage of the number of cases eligible for each type of
departure in that year - mitigated departures as a percentage
of the number of cases with presumptive executed prison terms,
and aggravated departures as a percentage of cases with presumptive stayed-prison terms. As shown in Figure 6,62 this
62 Throughout this Article, adjusted (percentage-of-eligibles) dispositional

departure rates are computed using the PRISON variable (executed prison
term) to determine the numerator, and the PRESUMPT variable (presumptive
disposition) to determine the denominator. The results vary slightly from
rates basing the numerator on the "departure" variable, DISPDEP.
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method produces very different mitigated dispositional departure rates than those shown in Figure 4. The reason for the
difference is that the number of cases with presumptive executed prison terms (the denominator of the adjusted mitigated rate)
is small, but the number and proportion of such cases has
increased substantially over time (from 15% of all cases sentenced in 1981, to 20% in 1983 and 25% in 1989). Thus, the
adjusted (percentage-of-eligibles) rates are consistently much
higher than the unadjusted (percentage-of-total-cases) rates,
varying between 19% and 33% (versus 3% to 7%, for the unadjusted rates). Furthermore, adjusted mitigated departures
outweigh adjusted aggravated departures by a factor of about 5
to 1 (versus about 2 to 1 for the unadjusted rates). Finally, the
adjusted mitigated departure rates vary less over time, increasing by only 38% between 1981 and 1989 (versus 123% for the
unadjusted rates). Moreover, the largest increases in adjusted
mitigated departures (in.1984 and 1985) were not the continuation of a consistent upward trend since 1981, as the unadjusted
rates would suggest. The adjusted rate went down in 1982, and
was only slightly higher in 1983 than it was in 1981.
As noted in later sections of the article, this statistical
adjustment has great implications for comparisons of departure
rates between certain sub-groups with substantially different
proportions of presumptive prison terms (e.g., race and gender
groups, judicial districts, and possibly judges within a county or
district). For present purposes, the point is more modest: how
we "keep score" with respect to departures determines how we
view compliance initially and over time. Adjusted (percentageof-eligibles) measures reveal that mitigated dispositional departures were quite common even in the first year of the Guidelines,
but did not increase as much over time as the Commission's
published figures indicated. Both points have important implications for evaluation of certain "prescriptive" features of the
Guidelines (see Part III). Using adjusted rates also more clearly
reveals that mitigated departure rates (dispositional as well as
durational) consistently have outweighed aggravated departure
rates. As discussed below, this pattern corroborates other
evidence suggesting that plea bargaining concessions remained
widespread under the Guidelines.
An even more serious definitional problem affects all of the
official durational and dispositional departure measures: these
measures assume that defendants found guilty in a given
Guidelines cell are comparable in different time periods, and
that uniformity and proportionality need only be assessed
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relative to conviction offense and criminal history categories. Of
course, crime patterns and prosecution policies do change, over
time - in some cases dramatically. For example, the Commission noted that the following significant changes had occurred
between 1978 and 1983:
(1) Defendant requests that their presumptive stayed
prison term be executed increased substantially, from
1981 to 1983.3 Such requests must be granted, under
State v. Randolph," if the proposed stay conditions
are very onerous.
(2) The number of child sex abuse cases also increased
dramatically between 1981 and 1983.65 As discussed
in Part III, these cases have consistently shown high
rates of mitigated dispositional departure, particularly
when the offender and victim are related.
(3) Rates of charge reduction to lower severity levels for
below-the-line cases with low criminal history scores
were much higher in 1981 through 1983 than in
1978.66
The first change explains all of the increase in aggravated
dispositional departures, between 1981 and 1983.6' The second trend explains some of the increase in mitigated departures.
On the other hand, the third point, increases in "vertical"
charge-bargaining between pre- and post-Guidelines periods,
suggests that comparisons of mitigated departure rates based on
conviction offense may substantially understate the mitigation
rate relative to the "real" offense. This in turn tends to overstate the "success" of the Guidelines in 1981. Clearly, some
vertical charge reductions are de facto mitigating dispositional
and/or durational departures. The same is sometimes also true
of "horizontal" reductions in the number of counts or concurrent
charges. 8

THREE YEAR EVALUATION, supra note 2, at 57.

See supra text accompanying note 39.
5 THREE YEAR EVALUATION, supra note 2, at 80.
6

Id. at 78.

67 Frase, supra note 3, at 738.

Under the Hernandez concurrent sentencing rule, supra text accompanying note 40, fewer counts at conviction produce a lower criminal history

score.
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What is needed, then, is a measure of adjusted mitigated
dispositional departure rates based on the defendant's "real
offense" and "real" criminal history score - that is, the maximum provable severity and number of charges, whether or not
such charges were filed or retained to conviction. As part of its
initial evaluations of Guidelines implementation, the Commission constructed a real-offense variable (called the "alleged
offense") based on its reading of corrections and court files (e.g.,
presentence investigation reports, the complaint or indictment,
etc.).69 Since evidentiary problems often do not appear in such
files, this measure tends to overstate "real" offense severity.
Another limitation is that alleged-offense data is only available
through 1984, and only for eight of the larger counties in the
state (representing about 60% of the state felony caseload).
Finally, it must be noted that there is no corresponding measure
of "real" (versus conviction-based) criminal history, so we cannot
precisely compute the "real cell" into which each defendant falls.
Using conviction-based criminal history tends to understate the
extent of the defendant's "real" criminal history.
As shown in Part I of Table 1, mitigated dispositional
departure rates based on the alleged offense" are higher in all
years than the conviction-offense-based rates for the same eight
counties, and the differences are especially great in the postGuidelines years. While conviction-offense departure rates fell
dramatically from 1978 to 1981 (from 48% to 20%), real-offense
departure rates only fell from 53% to 47%. Thus, most of the
apparent "improvement" in conviction-offense dispositional
departure rates in 1981 (Figures 4 and 6) seems to have been
due to changes in charging and/or plea bargaining. By 1981,
many more of the cases eligible for presumptive prison-commit
sentences (based on the "real" offense) were resulting in convic6 9T

MREE YEAR EVALUATION, supra note 2, at 19-20.
70 Alleged-offense presumptive-prison cases (the denominator) fall into
three categories: 1) the alleged offense severity and conviction-based criminal
history place defendant below the disposition line (as amended in 1981); 2)
although the alleged offense is above the disposition line, defendant is also
alleged to have used a dangerous weapon, thus making him or her eligible for
a presumptive prison sentence based on the mandatory minimum term
imposed by MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.11 (West 1992); or 3) although not falling
into either of the above categories, defendant's presumptive sentence at
conviction was an executed prison term. (There are very few of these cases.
Most appear to be recidivist sex offenders covered by another mandatory
minimum statute, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.346 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993), who
are not otherwise identifiable from alleged offense data.)
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TABLE 1
Mitigated Dispositional Departure Rates (percent non-prison
sentence), by Year and Location on the Guidelines Grid, for
Defendants with Presumptive Prison Sentences Based on Conviction
Offense and on Alleged Offense
(Eight-County,In-depth Samples)
Pre-Guidelines
1978
I.

II.

Post-Guidelines
1981
1984

All presumptive-prison cases:
- based on conviction offense
- based on alleged offense

48
53

20
47

27
45

Cases at Severity levels VII-X:
- based on conviction offense
- based on alleged offense

39
51

16
45

30
50

Note: See text and notes accompanying this table [note 70] for definition of alleged offense
presumptive prison cases.

tions on less serious charges, carrying no presumptive prison
sentence.7 1

Between 1981 and 1984, conviction-offense mitigated dispositional departure rates went back up, to 27%, while allegedoffense rates fell a bit further, to 45%. However, there is one
further potential problem with the latter figure: as noted above,
overall alleged-offense departure rates are based on criminal
history at conviction, not "real" criminal history. But criminal
history at conviction was measured differently after 1981, due to
the multi-count sentencing rule approved in State v.
Hernandez.72 Part II of Table 1 avoids this problem, since
criminal history does not affect the presumptive disposition at
severity levels VII to X (where all cases are presumptive prison-

"' In 1978, 77% of presumptive-prison-commit cases based on alleged
offense were also presumptive-commits based on the conviction offense. By
1981, this proportion had fallen to 63% (eight-county in-depth data). These
results are consistent with the Commission's finding that charge reduction
increased under the Guidelines. See supra, text accompanying note 39. In
contrast, Miethe's 1987 article concluded that "charging and plea bargaining
practices remained fairly stable across pre- and post-Guidelines periods."
Miethe, supra note 3, at 165. Miethe's results are questioned in Tonry,
StructuringSentencing, 10 CRIME & JUST. 267, 312 n.7 (1988).
72
See supra text accompanying note 40.
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commits). Once again, the real-offense data shows much less
"improvement" (decrease in departure rates) between 1978 and
1981 than is reflected in the conviction-offense-based departure
rates, and also much less "slippage" (increase in departure
rates) between 1981 and 1984. Nevertheless, the real-offense
mitigated departure rate in 1984 (50%) was almost as high as it
was in 1978 (51%).
As noted earlier, these real-offense "departure" rates are
undoubtedly exaggerated by the fact that many "alleged" offenses were not legally provable. Thus, the real "real offense"
departure rates must lie somewhere in between the convictionoffense rates shown in Figure 6 and the real-offense rates
shown in Table 1. It is also possible that the evidentiary
strength of charges changed over time (although it seems
unlikely to have changed dramatically). The'most important
point here is that future Guidelines reformers and researchers
must seek to develop and maintain,over time better real-offense
measures. Without such measures, we cannot assess the effects
of de facto departures achieved through charging leniency. And
without combined measures of de jure and de facto departures,
we cannot accurately assess either the initial success of guidelines, or their evolution over time.
B. RACIAL AND GENDER DISPARITIES IN DISPOSITIONAL
DEPARTURES

One of the most important goals of the Guidelines is to
eliminate the impact of race, gender, and socio-economic variables on sentencing. Early evaluations of the Guidelines concluded that such biases had largely been eliminated as direct
causes of sentencing disparity, although they continued to
indirectly affect sentences (for example, minority offenders tend
to have higher criminal history scores). 3 Since 1984, the
Commission has only collected data on race and gender.74 For

'" See, e.g., Miethe & Moore, Socioeconomic Disparities,supra note 3, at
352-55 (table 2), 358.
"' Although the effect of social class variables on dispositional departures
is not addressed directly in this study, the race variables studied probably
include some indirect effects of social class.
This study also disregards durational departures, and the extent of such
departures, because these decisions are more difficult to model with the
available data. Appellate case law (discussed supra text accompanying notes
33-36) has held that durational departures must be based exclusively on case-
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present purposes, we will analyze only the three principal racial
groups in Minnesota, plus gender.
As indicated in Figures 7a, 7b, and 8, males had consistently higher reported dispositional departure rates (aggravated and
mitigated) than females in all years since 1984. However, racial
patterns were more complex: Blacks had higher mitigated
departure rates than Whites in all years, with aggravated
departure rates that were initially lower, then higher, than
White rates; American Indian rates showed a very different
pattern, with aggravated departure rates higher than White
rates in all years, while mitigated departure rates were initially
lower, then higher, than White rates.

Departure rates (%)

FIGURE 7a
Reported Mitigated Dispositional
Departure Rates
(% of all cases sentenced)
by Race, 1985 through 1989
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specific aggravating and mitigating culpability factors. These factors are not
even indirectly measured by any variables in the post-1984 datasets. There
also appear to be fewer consistent racial and gender disparities in sentence
durations than are found in dispositional decisions.
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FIGURE 7b
Reported Aggravated Dispositional Departure Rates
(% of all cases sentenced)
by Race, 1985 through 1989
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Once again, however, these officially-reported departure
rates conceal the real patterns because the percentages are
based on total cases, and fail to take into account major differences in the proportions of each group with presumptive prison
terms - much higher proportions of Black, Indian, and male
offenders have presumptive prison-commit sentences, so these
offender groups would be expected to have higher numbers of
mitigated departures and fewer aggravated departures even if
all sub-groups were treated equally. Figures 9a, 9b, and 10
report the adjusted departure rates computed on a percentageof-eligibles basis.75 Figure 10 shows that the ratio of male to
female aggravated departure rates is about two-to-one. This is
even higher than the ratio of the unadjusted rates shown in
Figure 8. Figure 10 also reveals that, contrary to Figure 8,
males had consistently lower mitigated departure rates. As for
racial groups, the conflicting trends of Figures 7a and 7b give
way to a more consistent pattern (Figures 9a and 9b): Blacks
and Indians had equal or higher aggravated departure rates
than Whites in all years. Blacks had lower mitigated departure
rates in all years, while Indian mitigation rates were equal to or
lower than White rates in four of the five years.
In an effort to explain the consistently less favorable treatment of certain minorities with respect to dispositional departures, this article focuses on sentencing in two years when
apparent racial disparity (as shown in Figures 9a and 9b) was
high: 1987, when the adjusted mitigated departure rate for
Whites was 40% higher than the Black rate (28.8% versus
20.5%, respectively); and 1988, when Black and Indian adjusted
aggravated departure rates exceeded White rates by 78% and
120%, respectively (7.1% and 8.8% versus 4.0%).

' See supra text accompanying note 62.
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FIGuRE 9a

Adjusted Mitigated Dispositional
Departure Rates (% of eligibles)
by Race, 1985 through 1989
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FIGURE 10

Adjusted Dispositional
Departure Rates (% of eligibles)
by Gender, 1985 through 1989
Departure rates (%)
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

I

I

1988

1989

III

1985

1986

females mitigated - ---..........

1987
Year

females aggravated

-

males aggravated

males mitigated

C. REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF MITIGATED
DIsPOsITIONAL DEPARTURES

Logistic regression was carried out for all Black and White
defendants with presumptive prison sentences in 1987 (1429
defendants, including 356 Blacks). The dependent variable is
NOPRISON, coded as 0 (committed to prison, the presumptive
disposition) or 1 (no prison commitment, i.e., a mitigated dispositional departure). In this sample, 26.7% of defendants are
mitigated departures. The independent variables are all variables in the database which are significantly related to the
dependent variable, including the following:
1. Offense-related variables
(1) Guidelines SEVERITY level (coded from 1 to 10)
(higher severity crimes have lower mitigated dispositional departure rates);
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(2) The offense was an ATTEMPT (0 = no, 1 = yes) (attempts have lower-than-average mitigated departure
rates (12%));
(3) Below-the-line weapon-use case (mandatory-minimum statute) (WPNBELOW) (0 = no; 1 = yes, 12%
departure rate);
(4) Above-the-line weapons statute case (WPNABOVE)
(0 = no, 1 = yes). Such cases have extremely high
mitigated dispositional departure rates (80%);
(5) Other (non-weapon) above-the-line presumptive
prison cases (OTHRABOV) (0 = no; 1 = yes, 56% departure rate);
(6) Intrafamilial Sex Abuse case (Severity level 7 or 8)
(IFSACASE) (0 = no; 1 = yes, 62% departure rate.
Almost all IFSA cases involve White offenders);
(7) Other first degree statutory rape case (STATRAP1)
(0 = no; 1 = yes, 40% departure rate);
2. Offender-related variables
(8) Custody Status (INCSTODY) (0 = no, 1 = yes.
Defendants who were on probation, parole, pre-sentence
release, escaped or confined at the time they committed
the current offense have low mitigated dispositional
departure rates (11%));
(9) Other criminal history points (excluding the Custody Status Point included in the previous variable)
(OTHRHIST) (coded from 0 to 6) (defendants with more
criminal history points have lower rates of mitigated
departure);
(10) Defendant's race (RACEAFRO) (0 = White, 29%
mitigated departure rate; 1 = Black, 21% departure
rate);
(11) Defendant's Gender (SEXMALE) (0 = female, 34%
departure rate; 1 = male, 26% departure rate);
3. Other independent variables
(12) Plea (PLEANOTG) (0 = guilty plea, 29% departure
rate; 1 = convicted at trial, 7% departure rate);
(13) HENNEPIN County case (0 = no, 1 = yes). This is
the state's largest county, with a slightly higher-thanaverage mitigated dispositional departure rate (29%)
and the highest proportion of Black defendants;
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(14) Ramsey County case (RAMSEYCO, 0 = no, 1 =
yes). The state's second-largest county, with a much
lower-than average mitigated departure rate (11%) and
the second-highest proportion of Black defendants.

TABLE 2

Variables Explaining Mitigated Dispositional Departures (No executed
prison sentence) Among Presumptive-Prison-Commit Black & White
Defendants in 1987
Independent
Variable
Offense-related
SEVERITY
ATTEMPT
WPNBELOW
WPNABOVE
OTHRABOV
IFSACASE
STATRAPI
Offender-related
INCSTODY
OTHRHIST
RACEAFRO
SEXMALE
Other variables
PLEANOTG
HENNEPIN
RAMSEYCO
•**
•*
•

Correlation
+ / -

Wald
Statistic

Significance
level (p)

-

8.5884
3.0785
2.4573
59.7326
9.8762
20.1186
5.5127

.0034 **
.0793
.1170
.0000 *
.0017 **
.0000 ***
.0189 *

-

37.7145
15.9796
1.5353
2.8824

.0000
.0001
.2153
.0895

-

28.1364
7.3536
3.2566

.0000 ***
.0067 **
.0711

+
+
+
+

+
-

*
***

Significant at p <.001
Significant at p <.01
Significant at p <.05

Logistic Regression, SPSS PC+, version 4.01. See text for definitions of independent variables
and table headings.

This model, which contains several variables not studied by
previous researchers, predicts 84% of the observed case outcomes (55% of the 382 no-prison cases and 94% of the 1047
prison cases). As shown in Table 2,6 "race" and "gender" are
6 Logistic regression is used to determine whether two or more indepen-

dent variables are significant predictors of a dependent variable which can
have only two values - an event occurring or not occurring. M. NORUSIS,
SPSS/PC+ ADVANCED STATISTICS FOR THE IBM PC/XT/AT AND PS/2, at B-39

(1990). In the regression results reported in Tables 2, 3, 4 and 8, the "corre-
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not statistically significant variables, but another "illegitimate"
factor, defendant's plea (PLEANOTG) is - indeed, it is one of
the strongest of the independent variables. Other non-Guidelines factors which are significant at the .05 probability level or
better are WPNABOVE, OTHRABOV, IFSACASE and
STATRAP1 (all positively associated with mitigated departures)
and INCSTODY and OTHRHIST (negatively associated). It is
thus clear that system actors have rejected several of the
Commission's prescriptive norms as to which offenses deserve
imprisonment, and which offender and other factors are legitimate (see Part III). The strength of the two criminal history
variables (INCSTODY and OTHRHIST) is particularly noteworthy, and suggests that judges are basing their departure decisions less on "just deserts" and more on offender-based utilitarian goals such as incapacitation, rehabilitation, and/or special
deterrence. Finally, the opposing effects of the two judicialdistrict variables show that geographic variations have not been
eliminated.
Given the significance of the two variables reflecting cell
location above the disposition line (WPNABOVE and
OTHRABOV), separate regression analyses were made of
presumptive-prison cases above and below the line. The results
for below-the-line cases (N=1,222) are very similar to those
shown in Table 2, except that SEXMALE becomes significant at
.05 (versus .09, in Table 2)." For above-the-line cases, however (N=207), the only significant independent variables are
PLEANOTG (p<.0001)and OTHRHIST (p<.0013).78 To further

lation +/-" column indicates which independent variables have a positive or
negative correlation with the dependent variable (e.g., the "-" next to Severity
means that offenses at higher severity levels have lower mitigated dispositional departure rates). The 'Wald statistic" shown in these tables is a
measure similar to Chi-square, and can be used to assess the strength and
statistical significance of each independent variable. The "significance"
heading in the tables shows the probability that the observed value of the
Wald statistic is due to chance. Id. at B-41 to -42. The present study uses the
5% significance level (.0500) commonly used in social science research. An
independent variable is deemed to be "significantly" related to the dependent
variable if the odds of the observed relationship being due to chance are 5% or
less. Id. at B-42, B-50.
77 This regression uses only 12 independent variables, deleting
WPNABOVE and OTHRABOV. The model once again predicts 84% of
observed dependent variable outcomes: 98% of the 1000 prison commitments,
but only 22% of the 222 stayed-prison cases (departures).
78 For this regression there are only 10 relevant independent variables
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test the basic model, the same three regressions were run for
1989, another year in which adjusted mitigated dispositional
departure rates were much greater for Whites than for Blacks
(29.6 versus 21.0%, respectively). In general, the same variables are significant in both years, but in a somewhat different
rank order, with "official" Guidelines variables more significant
in 1989 than they were in 1987. 79
It is possible, of course, that unmeasured variables,"0 or
variations within categories of the measured variables, explain
some of these patterns. Plea/trial variations are discussed more
fully later in this part of the paper. Racial differences are taken
up again in Part III.
D. REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF AGGRAVATED
DISPOSITIONAL DEPARTURES

To analyze the apparent racial disparity in rates of aggravated dispositional departure (see Figure 9b), logistic regression
was carried out on all 1988 presumptive stayed-prison cases
involving Whites, Blacks, and American Indians (N=5,535,
including 967 Blacks and 272 Indians). The dependent variable
is PRISON (0 = no (presumptive stayed sentence imposed), 1 =
yes (committed to prison, aggravated departure)). Of the defendants in this sample, 4.8% had aggravated departures. The
regression model used above was modified to exclude independent variables specific to mitigated departures, and to include
four new variables. In this sample, crimes against persons

(WPNBELOW, OTHRABOV, IFSACASE, and STATRAP1 are deleted). The
model predicts 95% of the 160 stayed-prison cases (departures), 34% of the 47
prison-commitment cases, and 81% overall.
7' For all 1989 presumptive-commit cases (N=I, 825), the following
variables (in order of decreasing strength) were significant at .0016 or better:
OTHRHIST, SEVERITY, WPNABOVE, INCSTODY, PLEANOTG,
OTHRABOV, and IFSACASE. HENNEPIN was only significant at .0840, and
STATRAP1 only at .2069. RACEAFRO and SEXMALE were again not significant (p=.28 and .14 respectively).
o For example, perhaps White defendants receive more lenient initial
charges or subsequent charge reductions, and thus have little need for
mitigated dispositional departures relative to the conviction offense. However,
an analysis of available "real offense" data does not support this hypothesis;
among alleged-offense presumptive-prison-commit cases in 1984 (the last year
for which alleged-offense data was collected, see supra, note 2 and text at note
69), the average drop in severity level, between alleged- and conviction-offense,
was .86 for Whites, and 1.11 for Blacks.
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(PERSNOFF; 0 = no, 1 = yes) and drug crimes (DRUGOFF; 0 =
no, 1 = yes) are more likely to result in a prison sentence than
are crimes against property or miscellaneous other offense types
in the same cell. Two other new variables are RACEAIND (0 =
other, 1 = American Indian) and DISTRCT9 (0 = other, 1 =
Judicial District 9). In 1988, about 25% of all Indian defendants
were sentenced in District 9, which had higher-than-average
aggravated dispositional departure rates for all defendants that
year.
TABLE 3

Variables Explaining Aggravated Dispositional Departures (Prison
commitment) among Presumptive-stayed-Prison White, Black &
American Indian Defendants in 1988
Independent
Variable

Correlation
+ / -

Wald
Statistic

Offense-related
SEVERITY

+

13.6157

PERSNOFF
DRUGOFF

+
+

2.3469
.1896

Offender-related
HISTORY

+

324.7315

RACEAFRO
RACEAIND
SEXMALE

+
+
+

3.9822
3.6469
.0582

+
PLEANOTG
+
HENNEPIN
RAMSEYCO
+
DISTRCT9
Significant at p <.001
•

.5873
.1854
.0067
21.8248

Significance
level (p)

.0002 *
.1255
.6698

.0000 *
.0460 *
.0562
.8094

Other variables

•

.4435
.6668
.9350
.0000 ***

Significant at p <.05

Logistic Regression, SPSS PC+, version 4.01. See text and notes accompanying this table and
Table 2, for definitions of independent variables and table headings.

The results are shown in Table 3. Although the model predicts 95% of the observed cases, it only predicts 4% of the
aggravated departures. Thus the only variables significant at
p<.05 are (in order of strength): HISTORY, 8 ' DISTRCT9, SE"' Unlike the presumptive-prison-commit cases analyzed above, presumptive stayed-prison cases show no particular strength for the custody status
component of criminal history. HISTORY (coded 0-6) is used here, instead of
INCSTODY and OTHRHIST.
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VERITY, and RACEAFRO; RACEAIND is of borderline significance, at p=.0562. As to both race variables, however, it should
be recalled that the Commission's "independent assessment" of
cases in the 1981 and 1982 "in depth" samples found that
Blacks and Indians had a higher proportion of cases in which an
82
aggravated dispositional departure was deemed appropriate.
In any case, the 1988 aggravated dispositional departures
are fairly easy to explain without regression analysis: over
three-quarters of those departures involved either defendant
requests for an executed prison term, pursuant to State v.
Randolph, supra, or defendants who were already in, or going
to, prison on other charges. The Randolph and other-charge
cases are somewhat more likely to involve Blacks and Indians,
but the major factor which distinguishes these departures is
their much higher average criminal history scores (2.3, for
Randolph cases and 3.0, for other-charge departures. The few
remaining aggravated departures had an average criminal
history score of 2.1, while the average for non-departure cases
was .7). These results are consistent with the overwhelming
strength of the HISTORY variable, as shown in Table 3, above.
Aggravated dispositional departures are difficult to model
statistically because they are so rare (5% of presumptive stayedprison cases), but jail sentences are much more common (about
70%). On the other hand, any model of jail sentences alone
would be seriously distorted by the fact that about one-sixth of
the no-jail outcomes are actually "worse" than jail (i.e., a prison
sentence). Accordingly, logistic regression was used to model
"custody sentencing," the imposition of either a prison or a jail
sentence, in presumptive stayed-prison cases. This model
predicts 77% of the outcomes (22% of the 1409 no-custody cases,
and 95% of the 4126 custody sentences). As shown in Table 4,
HISTORY and the three offense variables are very strong but so
is SEXMALE and one of the two large urban county variables
(RAMSEYCO); RACEAIND and HENNEPIN are also significant. Application of the same model (excluding the two offensetype variables, which were not available for that year), to 1989
"2TEE YEAR EVALUATION, supranote 2, at 66-67; see also id. (describing
the in-depth samples). When the same model is applied to 1989 cases (excluding the offense-type variables, which were not available for that year), two of
the variables remain significant at .0000: HISTORY and SEVERITY (Wald
values = 376.1 and 36.3). However, the DISTRCT9, RACEAFRO, and RACEAIND variables are no longer even close to significant. PLEANOTG is
significant at .0011.
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TABLE 4
Variables Explaining Imposition of a Custody Sentence (Prison OR
Jail) among Presumptive-Stayed-Prison White, Black & American
Indian Defendants in 1988

Independent
Variable
Offense-related
SEVERITY
PERSNOFF
DRUGOFF
Offender-related
HISTORY
RACEAFRO
RACEAIND
SEXMALE
Other variables
PLEANOTG
HENNEPIN
RAMSEYCO
DISTRCT9
•**
•*
•

Wald
Statistic

Significance
level (p)

+
+
+

56.9060
15.7565
49.8609

.0000 *
.0001 *
.0000 ***

+
+
+
+

153.5035
.9716
5.8313
141.0204

.0000 *
.3243
.0157 *
.0000 *

2.9651
10.2676
81.0805
2.9044

.0851
.0014 **
.0000 *
.0883

Correlation
+ / -

+
-

+

Significant at p <.001
Significant at p <.01
Significant at p <.05

Logistic Regression, SPSS PC+, version 4.01. See text and notes accompanying this table and
Table 2, for definitions of independent variables and table headings.

cases yielded similar results, with the following exceptions:
SEXMALE is even stronger than HISTORY, in 1989 (Wald
values = 211 and 124, respectively; p = .0000 for both);
DISTRCT9 becomes significant (more severe) at p = .0000; and
RACEAIND, PLEANOTG, and HENNEPIN increase in strength
(p = .0007, .0016, and .0000, respectively).
The powerful influence of criminal history once again
confirms the strong residual commitment to utilitarian sentencing goals in Minnesota,"3 and the significance of the county
variables reveals continuing geographic diversity, but what
explains the equally strong influence of gender? Further research, using variables not available in the existing data, will be
needed to determine the extent to which these gender differences are attributable to unmeasured offense or offender factors.
Are males more often instigators? More likely to repeat the

' See infra part III.
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same or similar offense? Less likely to have custody of children
who would be harmed if their primary parent received a custody
sentence? Or are they simply more feared, especially if single
and unemployed?
Similarly, the greater severity shown toward American
Indians (but not Blacks) in the use of custody sentences requires
further research to determine whether this is due to the presence of aggravating factors in their cases (as was found in the
Commission's earlier in-depth studies),8 4 or whether it reflects
bias against Indians, higher unemployment, 5 or other factors.
Judges are probably reluctant to imprison the rare defendant
who has succeeded in finding and keeping a job, and unemployed defendants may be less likely to strongly resist imposition of a jail term. Indians may also be more likely to have
been held in pretrial detention (e.g., because they are unemployed, homeless, or subject to bias); if so, that fact might
substantially increase their likelihood of receiving at least a
short jail sentence - as part of a "time-already-served" guilty
plea,86 and/or because pretrial detainees make a worse impression at sentencing.
E. PLEA BARGAINING DISPARITIES
The earlier regression analysis of mitigated dispositional
departures revealed the continued existence of plea-trial disparities: controlling for offense severity, criminal history, and
eleven other variables, defendants found guilty at trial were
found to be significantly more likely to receive a prison sentence
(see Table 2). Whether the method of disposition causes this
difference is unclear; defendants who go to trial have higher
offense severity and criminal history scores, so it is possible that
trial cases are more aggravated even within categories of conviction offense, prior record, and the other measured variables.
Even if more variables and sub-categories were available,
we could never be absolutely certain that all appropriate sen-

84THREE YEAR EVALUATION, supra note 2, at 66-67.

8 The 1984 in-depth data (WORKSENT variable) shows that Indians had
slightly higher unemployment rates at the time of sentencing than Blacks, and
much higher rates than Whites.
' See Richard S. Frase, REVIEw ESSAY: DEFINING THE LIMITs OF CRIME
CONTROL AND DUE PROCESS,

review).

73 CAL. L. REV. 212, 230, 234-37 (1985) (book
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tencing factors had been taken into account. As is often the
case in social science research, we must rely on the corroboration provided by a variety of less-than-ideal measures - in
Hans Zeisel's classic phrase, "triangulation of proof."17 In the
present case, these various measures reveal that the overwhelming majority of convictions involve not only guilty pleas, but
negotiated guilty pleas' - presumably negotiated in return for
some form of leniency. Moreover, there is a remarkably consistent overall pattern of leniency in the application of Guidelines
imprisonment rules. It is possible, of course, that presumptive
sentences are consistently too severe, or that mitigating circumstances are inherently much more common than aggravating
factors. In light of the high rate of pleas and plea negotiation,
however, it seems much more likely that this pattern of leniency
reflects tacit or explicit sentence bargaining which causes
reduced sentence severity for defendants who plead guilty.
Consider the following:
(1) Mitigated durational departures have always been
twice as common as aggravated departures (see Figure
5).
(2) Mitigated dispositional departures have generally
been five or six times more frequent than aggravated
departures, as a percentage of offenders eligible for
each type of departure (see Figure 6). Moreover, aggravated dispositional departure rates would be even lower
(1.1% versus 4.7% of presumptive non-prison cases, in
1988) if defendant requests for prison and prison terms
concurrent with other charges were excluded.89
87

HANS ZEISEL, SAY IT WITH FIGUREs 190-99 (5th ed. 1968).

s THREE YEAR EVALUATION, supra note 2, at 72 (Table 27).
89
It must also be remembered that, as to both durational and dispositional
departures, conviction-based statistics tend to understate the number and
proportion of mitigated departures, while overstating aggravated departures.
First, as noted earlier, mitigated departure rates do not include de facto
departures achieved through non-filing, reduction or dismissal of provable
charges. Second, charging leniency of this kind is sometimes coupled with an
"aggravated' dispositional and durational departure on the lower charge of
conviction. Such departures produce a prison term which is still shorter than
the defendant would have received on the provable higher charge - an
"aggravated" departure which is, in reality, a mitigated one! An example of
such a case is State v. Garcia, 302 N.W.2d 643 (Minn. 1981), upholding aggravated dispositional and durational departures in a case involving a significant
charge reduction (from a seemingly-provable first-degree rape (severity level
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(3) The Commission's independent assessment of
Guidelines departures in 1981 and 1982 consistently
found that mitigated departures were less often justifiable than aggravated ones; 9
(4) The Commission's assessment of 1981 and 1982
cases receiving the presumptive sentence (non-departures) consistently found that most failures to make a
justifiable departure91 were failures to aggravate, not
failures to mitigate;
(5) Despite these high rates of mitigating departures
and failures to aggravate, prosecution appeal rates
have remained low. Indeed, less than 1% of all sentences had been appealed by either side, as of July of
1984; in the same period, about 13.5% of sentences
included a departure, 92 and an unknown additional
proportion represented unjustifiable failures to depart;
(6) Overall prison rates for cases tried are much higher
than for cases pled guilty, and neither rate has changed
much since 1978. Even when trial and plea cases are
analyzed within "real offense" grid cells, to take account
of charging variations as well as sentence-bargaining
and formal departures, the results indicate that the
disparity in prison rates between trial and guilty plea
cases did not decline with the advent of the Guidelines.93

VIII) to kidnapping (level VI).
90 THREE YEAR EVALUATION, supra note 2, at 54, 56.
91 Id.

92 Id. at 110 (estimated 2,300 departures, out of 17,000 Guidelines sen-

tences imposed).
9
' This comparison, which uses the Commission's "alleged offense" severity
variable, see supra text accompanying note 69, might be called "real-offense
plea-trial grid variance" (by analogy to the Commission's early "grid variance"
measure, see supra note 60). For each conviction-criminal-history by allegedoffense-severity cell containing both guilty plea and trial cases, the prison rate
for plea cases is subtracted from the rate for trials, then weighted (multiplied)
by the number of trial cases in that cell (which is invariably smaller than the
number of guilty pleas). The sum of these weighted cell differences is then
divided by the sum of the trial cases in those same cells. In 1978, the average
difference in the prison rate (percent), between trial and guilty plea cases in
each alleged-offense cell, was 16.4%; in 1981, it was 18.0%.
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Thus, it appears likely that whatever plea-trial disparities
there were before the Guidelines went into effect continued to
exist in the early post-Guidelines years, and still exist today.
Plea bargaining, and its accompanying charge and sentence
disparities, is "alive and well" in Minnesota. The continued
existence of widespread plea bargaining concessions also suggests that lower limits on sanction severity are much less likely
to be enforced than upper limits - a finding consistent with a
theory of "limiting retributivism," but inconsistent with any
more precise, "defining" retributive model (see below).
III. PROPORTIONALITY AND THE COMMISSIONS
"PRESCRIPTIVE" CHANGES
The goal of proportionality requires that sanction severity
increase in direct proportion to increases in offense severity and
criminal history (as defined by the Guidelines). The previous
discussion has already shown how overall proportionality
changed under the Guidelines: as measured by convictionoffense departure rates, proportionality in prison commitments
and durations increased in the first years of the Guidelines and
(with the exception of mitigated dispositional departures)
remained at much lower levels through 1989 (see Figures 5 and
6). However, "real offense" mitigated dispositional departure
rates were much higher in all years, and were only modestly
lower in the first post-Guidelines year (1981) than in 1978. 94
Moreover, regression analysis of prison use revealed that system
actors have rejected the Commission's imprisonment norms for
certain offenses (especially intrafamilial child sex abuse and
above-the-line weapons statute cases), 5 and that method of
disposition (guilty plea versus trial) is a very strong factor in
the granting of mitigated departures. This analysis further
shows that two of the strongest factors are the defendant's
custody status at the time of the offense and other criminal
history points - factors which are more closely linked to utilitarian than retributive sentencing goals.

9 See Table I and accompanying text.
9 The reluctance to imprison above-the-line presumptive-commit defendants (mostly weapons cases) appears even stronger when cases are analyzed
using the "alleged offense" variable described supra text accompanying note
69. On a conviction-offense basis, the prison rate for such cases increased
from 13% to 50%, between 1978 and 1981; on a real-offense basis, however,
the prison rate actually fell, from 25% to 19%.
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The purpose of the following discussion is to examine
proportionality in the sentencing of particular cases where the
Guidelines Commission expressly sought to change pre-existing
norms. The focus once again is on the use of state prison
sentences, since the Guidelines impose almost no limitations on
the use of local jail or other conditions of non-prison sentences.
A. THE "PERSON" VERSUS "PROPERTY" DISTINCTION
One of the most significant normative changes sought by
the Commission was to increase prison rates for offenders with
low criminal histories convicted of high severity "person" offenses (e.g., rape, armed robbery), while decreasing prison rates for
lower severity (mostly property) offenders with medium to high
criminal histories.9 6 The rationale for these changes was apparently twofold: first, "just deserts" sentencing requires that
offense severity receive greater weight than criminal record;
second, limited prison space should be reserved for physically
dangerous persons.
TABLE 5

Imprisonment rates for high-severity offenses
(Severity levels VII through X), by year
1978

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

61.1

85.9

87.8

76.5

72.5

72.5

74.8

77.4

73.5

72.5

We will first examine sentencing of high-severity ("person")
offenses. As shown in Table 5, prison rates for all defendants
convicted at severity levels VII through X increased in the early
years of the Guidelines, then fell back substantially, but remained higher than before the Guidelines. However, as was
shown previously, when cases are analyzed by real-offense
severity levels, using the Commission's "alleged offense" variable, it appears that only modest change was achieved in 1981,
and that, by 1984, prison rates for defendants at alleged-offense
severity VII through X had almost returned to pre-Guidelines
levels (see Part II of Table 1).

96 MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N, supra note 6, at 15;

THREE YEAR EVALUATION, supra note 2, at 21.
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TABLE 6

Prison rates for Severity Level VII and VIII defendants, by year,
based on conviction offense and criminal history

Severity VII:
History = 0
all defendants
Severity VIII:
History = 0
all defendants

1978

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

39.1
60.1

71.8
84.5

71.9
86.5

66.7
83.3

54.8
74.8

51.8
74.4

58.4
74.8

68.2
83.0

46.8
72.1

51.0
70.2

41.9
55.8

85.4
87.0

80.3
87.1

39.8
59.0

52.0
65.4

47.3
64.6

57.5
69.9

55.3
65.4

50.0
70.8

53.3
69.3

TABLE 7

Prison rates for Severity Level VII and VIII defendants,
by year, based on alleged offense and criminal history
at conviction
Pre-Guidelines
Level VII, History = 0
all level VII defendants
Level VIII, History = 0
all level VIII defendants

Post-Guidelines

1978

1981

1984

24.3
45.9
31.8
44.8

40.5
55.1
33.7
46.9

26.7
55.1
23.8
39.7

Most of the non-prison sentences reflected in Table 5 are
found at severity levels VII or VIII," particularly for defendants with no prior record (see Table 6). But as shown in Table
7, prison rates for these defendants are even lower by "alleged
offense." Table 7 also shows that, for defendants at level VIII,
real-offense prison rates hardly increased at all even in the first
year of the Guidelines, and by 1984 had fallen below 1978
levels.
As suggested in Part II of this article, 8 much of the high
departure rate at levels VII and VIII occurs in child sex abuse
cases, and the number of these cases was increasing very

" Prison rates for defendants convicted at levels IX and X equalled 100%
in all years except 1978 and 1989. At alleged levels IX and X prison rates
were about 80-90% from 1978 through 1984.
98

See supra text accompanying note 76.
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rapidly in the early 1980s. 99 In 1987, the prison rate for defendants convicted of intrafamilial sex abuse (IFSA) at level VII or
VIII was only 40%, and the rate for non-IFSA statutory rape
cases at levels VII and VIII was 58%. If these cases are excluded, the 1987 prison rate for levels VII and VIII combined rises
from 75 to 86% (equivalent to a departure rate of 14%). Nevertheless, the departure rate for the remaining defendants at level
VII
with zero criminal
history remains fairly
high - 30% - suggesting that criminal justice actors were
resisting the Commission's prescriptive norms not only for child
abuse sex cases, but also for other person offenders with no
prior record.

FIGURE 11

Prison Rates for Property Offenders
1978, 1981 to 1989
Prison rates (%)
20

15

10

5

0

I

1978

1981

1982

1983

1984 1985
Year

II

1986

I

1987

I

1988

1989

Such cases increased about ten-fold from 1981 to 1985, then declined but
remained at fairly high levels through 1989. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMN, SUMMARY OF 1989 SENTENCING PRACTICES FOR CONVICTED
FELONS 56 (1991).
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FIGURE 12

Prison Rates (%) by cell, 1989
CRIMINAL HISTORY SCORE
CONVICTION
OFFENSE SEVERITY
Sale Sim. Cont. Subst. I

Theft Rel-Agg Forgery II

Theft <2500

Non-Res Burglary

Resburg-Robbery

Assault 2-CSC 2

AGG Robbery

Assault 1-CSC 1

III

IV

V

VI
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Total

X

1Total

8.4
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13.1
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.3

1.9

4.6

13.5

18.8

43.5

87.5

8.9
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80

1446

.5

2.3

9.8

23.0

74.3

73.2
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19.0

830
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145

1686

1.4

5.2

14.0

27.9
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21.2
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231
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130
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11.1
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91.7
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24.4

304
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36
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5.3

16.3

21.0

62.9

97.4

82.8

83.8

20.7
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70

38
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37

1056

51.0

70.0

75.5

90.6

92.3

100.0 90.9

70.2

145

60

53

32

26

20

33

369

76.5

91.7

94.1

88.9

100.0

83.3

69.3

34

24

17

9

8

6

205

92.0
25

Murder 2, Intent

6

1.9

VIII 53.3

IX

5

0.0

107
Murder 2, Felony

4
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100.0 100.0 100.0
5

2

3
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0

0

0

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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1

2

2

1

2
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5.7
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22.0

3989
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Figure at bottom of each cell is the number of defendants.
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As for the "property" side of the person-versus-propertyoffense distinction, the Commission's prescriptive norm was
generally accepted by system actors in the early years. However, as shown in Figure 11, by 1983 the percentage of property
offenders imprisoned had risen to the same level as before the
Guidelines, and rose even further through 1989. Most of this
increase was the result of property offenders acquiring higher
and higher criminal history scores, which pushed more and
more of these offenders across the disposition line. Thus, the
percentage of property offenders with criminal history scores of
four or more doubled from 1981 to 1989, and the percentage
with presumptive prison sentences increased from 7% to almost
17%."' ° The higher scores were apparently the result of prosecutors charging and requiring defendants to plead to more
counts, combined with the application of Hernandez' concurrent-counts sentencing. Moreover, even if a low-severity defendant's criminal history is not quite high enough to move him
across the disposition line, he is still fairly likely to get a prison
sentence, as above-the-line defendants at severity levels I to IV
with at least three criminal history points have always had
fairly high prison commitment (upward departure) rates: 19%
in 1981, increasing to 24% in 1989. Departure rates in some of
these cells are as high as 50% (see Figure 12).
B. JUST DESERTS VERSUS UTILITARIAN SENTENCING
GOALS

The fact that system actors (judges, attorneys, and probation officers) insist on imprisoning many property offenders with
moderate to high criminal history scores, and refuse to imprison
certain high-severity person offenders with very low criminal
history scores, suggests that these decision makers did not
accept the Commission's decision to shift away from sentencing
based on offender characteristics and the utilitarian, offenderbased sentencing goals of rehabilitation and incapacitation.
The latter goals were given explicit judicial approval in the
amenable- and unamenable-to-probation departure cases described in Part I. As I have argued at greater length
elsewhere,' °2 such departures are both justifiable and desir-

'00 Id. at 57.
101 See supra text accompanying note 40.
102

Frase, supra note 3, at 742-48; Frase, supra note 35 passim.
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able, provided they are limited to exceptional cases and are not
granted in a discriminatory manner. Amenable-to-probation
departures avoid unnecessary incarceration (thus serving the
overall goal of "parsimony"), minimize the worsening effects of
prison on "salvageable" defendants, and conserve scarce prison
space for more dangerous offenders. Both types of amenability
departure encourage the system to deal more honestly with
difficult cases, rather than achieving the same results de facto
by various means (e.g., manipulation of the number or severity
of charges; granting of probation with the expectation that it
will promptly be revoked). Furthermore, such departures are
consistent with Minnesota statutes, which continue to recognize
utilitarian goals. Such departures also are consistent with the
Guidelines themselves, which explicitly approve the pursuit of
utilitarian goals in setting conditions of stayed sentences, and
which have never limited departures to retributive grounds.
The amenability departures are not consistent with any precise, "defining" retribution theory, in which Just Deserts sets a
0
specific penalty for each case,0'
but the Guidelines Commission never actually implemented such a theory. By declining to
provide guidelines for conditions of stayed-prison sentences, and
by failing to promulgate plea bargaining guidelines or even
request a legislative mandate to do so, the Commission was, in
effect, endorsing a "limiting" retributive theory in which presumptive disposition rules and prison durations set upper but
rarely lower limits on sanction severity. The overwhelming
majority of defendants have always had presumptive stayedprison terms (85%, in 1981, declining to 75% in 1989). Although
the conditions of stayed sentences are occasionally as onerous as
the presumptive stayed prison duration,0 4 and some stays are
later revoked,' 5 the great majority of defendants receive (and
are clearly expected to receive) less than their full "just deserts"
(as measured by the duration of their presumptive stayed prison
term). Similarly, plea bargaining leniency acts (and must have
been expected to act) to mitigate presumptive prison commitment and duration rules. Thus, if the amenability departures

3
..
See generally NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 199

(1982); NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 73-76 (1974).
104 See State v. Randolph, 316 N.W.2d 461 (Minn. 1981) (holding that
defendants have the right to demand execution of the presumptive stayed
term in such cases).
105
See infra text accompanying note 123.
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seem inconsistent with the Guidelines' Just Deserts theory, it is
because the role and importance of that theory has been overstated in much of what has been written about the Guidelines.
However, amenability departures do have a potential to be
over-used, or to be used in a discriminatory manner. How often
do they occur, and in what kinds of cases? Are unamenable-toprobation departures likely to be imposed on minority, lowerclass males with a "bad attitude"? Are amenable-to-probation
defendants likely to be White and middle-class?
The unamenable-to-probation departures are actually fairly
rare, and have become less frequent over time. In 1988, for
example, they accounted for only 12% of aggravated dispositional departures, and only .6% of defendants with presumptive
stayed sentences."0 6 Black and Indian defendants are more
likely to receive such departures (1.2% and 1.5% of presumptive
stayed cases in each racial group), but these defendants also
tend to have significantly higher criminal histories.
Amenable-to-probation departures are much more common,
and their use increased substantially in the first half of the
1980s.10 7 Since 1985, they have accounted for about half of all
mitigated dispositional departures, and about 15% of defendants
with presumptive prison sentences. Their location on the
Guidelines grid has been fairly constant, however. Over threequarters fall into one of three categories: 1) above the disposition line (weapons and other mandatory prison-commit cases; 2)
just "over" (one cell below or to the right of) the disposition line;
or 3) level VIII with zero criminal history (mostly Intrafamilial
and other child sex abuse cases). Such departures are almost
never granted at severity levels IX and X.

"0 Thirty two defendants in 1988 (out of 267 aggravated dispositional
departures, and 5732 presumptive stayed-prison cases) had departures based
on "unamenable to probation" (reason code 310) and/or "not amenable to
rehabilitation" (reason code 539). These departure reason codes are described,
and their use tabulated (without adjustment for multi-reason departures), in
MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N, JUDGES' REASONS FOR DEPARTURE (1991).
107 Id. at 6-7 (sum of reason codes 530 to 536).
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TABLE 8

Variables Explaining Amenable-to-Probation Departures
Among Presumptive-Prison-Commit White and Black
Defendants in 1987
Independent
Variable
Offense-related
SEVERITY
ATTEMPT
WEAPON
ABOVLINE
IFSACASE
STATRAPI
Offender-related
INCSTODY
OTHRHIST
RACEAFRO
SEXMALE
Other variables
PLEANOTG
HENNEPIN
RAMSEYCO
•*
•

Correlation
+ / -

+
+
+
-

+
+
-

Wald
Statistic

Significance
level (p)

2.6578
2.1063
5.8023
10.7302
10.9503
5.5392

.1030
.1467
.0160
.0011
.0009
.0186

19.9885
9.6171
.7452
.0038

.0000 ***
.0019 **
.3880
.9511

10.7221
7.8668
1.9248

.0011 **
.0050 **
.1653

*
**
***
*

Significant at p <.001
Significant at p <.01
Significant at p <.05

Logistic Regression, SPSS PC+, version 4.01. See text and notes accompanying this table and
Table 2, for definitions of independent variables and table headings.

C. REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF AMENABLE-TO-PROBATION
DEPARTURES

In an effort to assess racial and gender bias in the use of
amenable-to-probation departures, logistic regression was
carried out using variables similar to those previously examined
as predictors of all mitigated dispositional departures. 08 As
shown in Table 8, RACEAFRO is not a statistically significant
predictor, and neither is SEXMALE. The variables significant
at p.< .05 are (in order of strength): INCSTODY (-), IFSACASE
0

' See supra note 76. A single WEAPON variable is used (0 = NO,

1=

YES), since this factor here operates in the same direction above and below
the disposition line. Location above the disposition line is measured by
ABOVLINE (0 = no, 1 = yes). The model predicts 85% of observed cases and
99% of no-departure case, but only 5.71% of amenable-to-probation departure
cases (which constitute 15% of the total).
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(+), ABOVLINE (+), PLEANOTG (-), OTHRHIST (-),
HENNEPIN (+), WEAPON (-), and STATRAP1 (+).09 The
IFSACASE, STATRAP1 and ABOVLINE variables once again
show the strong field resistance to presuming imprisonment,
even for first offenders, in these cases. Similarly, the two strong
criminal history variables (INCSTODY and OTHRHIST) are
traditionally much more closely associated with utilitarian goals
than with the Just Deserts theory so often claimed to be the
foundation of the Minnesota Guidelines. Once again, plea-trial
disparity is strong, and so are inter-district differences. Comparison of all ten judicial districts reveals even wider variations
(significant at .00001): one district only granted amenable-toprobation departures in 5% of its presumptive prison cases;
another granted them in over 27% of such cases." °
The theory and application of amenability departures thus
reveals the strong continuing influence of utilitarian sentencing
goals in Minnesota. At the same time, the pattern of these
departures reflects the retributive scaling built into the
Guidelines' offense severity and criminal history scores: unamenable-to-probation departures cluster just above the disposition
line, while amenable-to-probation departures cluster just below
it (or above it, in the case of weapons and other above-the-line
mandatory-prison cases), and these two types of departure are
almost never found at the low and high extremes of offense
severity and criminal history. A similar pattern appears in the
overall departure rates, by cell (see Figure 12). Thus, in practice, the Minnesota Guidelines resemble the "four-band" theory
proposed by Morris and Tonry: some cases are almost always
kept out of prison, and some are almost always "in," with two
intermediate bands (presumptive out and presumptive in, each
with high departure rates)."'

109

Application of the same model to 1989 data produced slightly different

results. Only seven variables were significant at p < .05, in order:
OTHRHIST (-), IFSACASE (+), PLEANOTG (-), SEVERITY (-), STATRAP1
(+), INCSTODY (-), AND ABOVLINE (+); WEAPON and HENNEPIN were no
longer significant.
110 In 1989, the inter-district differences were less dramatic (significance =
.02231), but the same two districts were again at the extremes (4% and 21%).
111

N. MORRIS & M. TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND PROBATION: INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENTS IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING SYSTEM 60 (1990).
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IV. AVOIDING PRISON AND JAIL OVERCROWDING
Although the 1978 enabling statute only required the
Commission to take existing correctional resources into "substantial consideration," the Commission chose to treat prison
capacity as a controlling factor in drafting and implementing
the Guidelines. To minimize the risk of overcrowding, the
Commission set a goal of never exceeding 95% of prison capacity." 2 The Commission did not specifically address the issue
of jail crowding, but its continued refusal to recommend presumptive jail terms for non-prison sentences has been motivated
in part by concerns about the limited resources of many coun13
ties.

1

As of 1989, Minnesota's prison and jail populations had
risen substantially, and its prison system was nearing or exceeding capacity." 4 However, as Table 9 shows, national prison and jail" 5 populations had risen even faster since 1978,
overcrowding was more serious,"' the U.S. prison population
rate per 100,000 residents was four times greater than Minnei' MINNESOTA SENTENcING GuIDELINES COMMN, supra note 6, at 14;
Frase, supra note 3, at 733-36.
113 See MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMIN, REPORT TO THE
LEGISLATURE ON THREE SPECIAL ISSUES 19-20, 35 (1989).
114 The 1989 average daily population of six Minnesota jails exceeded the
capacity of those jails, and many other jails must have been overcrowded at
various times; in 1990, eight jails had average populations over their capacities. Interview with Mr. Dennis Falenschek, Inspection & Enforcement Unit,
Minnesota Department of Corrections (Nov. 19, 1991). But see MINNESOTA
LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, supra note 7, at 16 (stating that in 1989, 60% of local
detention facilities in Minnesota were operating over the Department's
recommended capacity levels of 60% to 80%, depending on size of jail); id. at
x (arguing that Minnesota avoided overcrowding because, unlike other states,
it had "excess capacity" in its jails and prisons in the late 1970s).
15The Minnesota and U.S. jail figures shown in the table include pretrial
detainees. Statistics on sentenced jail prisoners alone are not available for
Minnesota, and would be unreliable in any case, since many unconvicted
detainees are serving what will later be deemed all or part of their jail or
prison sentence. See Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as a
Guide to American Law Reform: How Do the French Do It, How Can We Find
Out, and Why Should We Care?, 78 CAL. L. REv. 539, 658 (1990).
116 All prison "capacity" data must be interpreted very cautiously, since
states often simply re-define their capacity (e.g., cells are deemed to be
"designed" for two prisoners, instead of one) to reduce their exposure to
prisoner lawsuits. See Franklin E. Zimring, Are State Prisons Undercrowded?,
4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 347 (1992).

330 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 2:279

sota's, and the national jail rate was almost two times greater.117
TABLE 9
Prison and Jail Populations in Minnesota and the U.S., 1978-1989
Minnesota

U.S. total

3,103
71
100%
+58%

703,687
271
110%
+130%

3,801
87

408,075
157

1989 prison populations:
1. year-end count
2. per 100,000 residents
3. percent of capacity
4. % increase since 1978
1989-90 jail populations
(including unsentenced inmates):
5. average daily population
6. per 100,000 residents
7.
8.

percent of capacity
% increase since 1978

Sources: lines 1 &

85%
+ 139%

104%
+ 158%

2: BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BULLETIN:

1989 at 2 table 2 (1990) (U.S. total includes both state and federal prisoners).
line 3: Id. at 6-7 tables 8 & 10.
line 4:1989 figures are from line 1; 1978 figures are from: BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
PRISONERS IN

DEP'T OF JUSTICE,

BULLETIN:

PRISONERS

IN STATE

AND

FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS ON

31, 1978 at 13 table 1 (1980) (U.S. = 306,602; Minn. = 1,965).
line 5: Minn: Interview with Mr. Dennis Falenschek, Inspection & Enforcement Unit, Minnesota
Department of Corrections (November 19, 1991) (average of reported average daily population
figures for calendar 1989 and 1990); U.S.: BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, BULLETIN: JAIL INMATES, 1990 at I table 1 (1991) (average daily population in year
ending June 30, 1990).
line 6: computed from other data in this table (line 5 divided by line 1, multiplied by line 2).
line 7: Minn.: Interview with Mr. Dennis Falenschek, supra (average of statewide occupancy
figures for calendar 1989 and 1990); U.S.: BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, BULLETIN: JAIL INMATES, 1990 at 2 table 5 (1991).
line 8:1989-90 figures are from line 5; 1978 figures are from Minn.: Mr. Dennis Falenschek,
supra (1,592.32 inmates); U.S.: BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
BULLETIN: JAIL INMATES, 1990 at 4 appendix table (1991) (157,930 inmates).
DECEMBER

17

To some extent, these differences reflect the state's relatively low crime

rates; Minnesota's incarceration rates per arrestedadult are closer to national
averages, particularly if arrests for violent crimes are weighted more heavily
in computing the denominator (to reflect the disproportionate impact such
arrests have on inmate populations). Cf Frase, supra note 115, at 657
(comparing French and U.S. incarceration rates per weighted arrest). For
example, if violent crime arrests are weighted (multiplied) by ten, the U.S.
prison population per weighted adult arrest is only 2.28 times the Minnesota
rate, and the U.S. jail population per weighted adult arrest is only 1.07 times
greater than Minnesota's. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM
CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES - 1989, at 172 (U.S.G.P.O.
1990) (U.S. arrest statistics); Interview with Mr. Ray Lewis, Statistical
Analysis Center, Minnesota Planning Office (May 11, 1993) (Minnesota arrest
statistics).
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FIGURE 13
Number of Inmates in Minnesota Jails and Prisons
1975-1990
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Source: Minn. Legislative Auditor, SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONAL
POLICIES 8 (1991) [based on Minn. Dept. of Corrections data]
Note: County Jail data is the average daily population during that year; State Prisons
data is the year-end (one-day) count.

FIGURE 14
Prison, Jail, and Overall Incarceration
Rates, 1978, 1981-1989
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The fact that Minnesota's jail population increased so much
faster than its prison population, from 1978 to 1989, might
suggest that the state achieved its goal of avoiding prison overcrowding by simply substituting the use ofjail terms. As shown
in Figure 13, however, jail populations had started to rise even
before 1978, and continued to increase fairly steadily throughout
the 1980s. Moreover, the proportion of sentenced felons receiving a state prison sentence remained fairly constant at about
20%, from 1978 through 1989 (see Figure 14). Nevertheless, the
percentage of felons receiving a jail sentence did increase - from 35% in 1978, to almost 59% in 1989. As a result,
the total custody sentence rate (jail or prison) for felons increased from 56%, in 1978, to 81% in 1989. The latter figures
suggest that overall sentencing severity was steadily increasing
in Minnesota, but that Guidelines policy kept prison rates
constant by accelerating the pre-Guidelines trend toward increased jail sentencing. At the same time, the number of
persons on probation was also increasing dramatically (doubling, between 1983 and 1989118). As a result, the total correctional population (prison, jail, probation, and parole) as a
percentage of index crime rates was the twelfth-highest in the
nation in 1987,"' and Minnesota's custody rate for felons (jail
OR prison sentence) is also higher than the national aver20
age.
Given the fairly constant prison sentence rate (about 20% of
sentenced felons in all years except 1981), why did Minnesota
prison populationsincrease by almost 60%, in the 1980's? As of
1989, this increase seemed to be almost entirely a function of
increased case volume. The number of felony sentences imposed
increased by 70%, between 1978 and 1989,121 while the aver122
age duration of prison "time served" hardly increased at all.
118 MINNESOTA LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR,
119

supranote 7, at 8 (Figure 1.2).

Id. at 10.

120 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BULLETIN:

FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE

COURTS, 1988, at 2 (1990) (Table 2) (estimated national custody rate in 1988
was 69%: 44% prison plus 25% jail). In 1988, Minnesota's rate was
79% - 21% prison plus 58% jail. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES
COMMN, 1988 DATA SUMMARY 1, 6 (1990).
21 Seven thousand nine hundred seventy-four defendants were sentenced
in 1989, THREE YEAR EVALUATION, supra note 2, at 20, compared to an
estimated 4698 in 1978. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N, supra
note 99, at 29.
122 The estimated average time served in prison prior to the Guidelines was

19931
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It also appears that the increased prison population was not due
to increased rates of revocation of probation or supervised (postprison) release. Prison admissions in each of the latter two
categories actually constituted a lower percentage of initial
prison commitments in 1989 (10% and 24%, respectively) than
However, the legislative
they did in 1978 (16% and 34%).'
and Guidelines changes enacted in 198912 will substantially
At the same time, prison rates
increase prison durations.'
may decline, as attorneys and judges use charge reductions and
mitigated departures to shelter certain defendants from harsh
prison terms.
CONCLUSION
Contrary to popular belief, the original Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines were only loosely based on a 'just deserts" model,
and they have become even less so over time. Moreover, some
of the most important "prescriptive" changes sought to be
imposed in the sentencing of certain offenders were resisted
even in the first year of implementation. Sentencing under the
Minnesota Guidelines has always been a multi-goal process,
pursuing the purposes of rehabilitation, incapacitation, and
prison population control within retributive upper (and occasionally lower) limits. Although some writers have viewed many of
the changes since 1980 as avoidable mistakes which under-

25.1 months. THREE YEAR EVALUATION, supra note 2, at 27. For defendants
sentenced in 1989, the average time served (assuming the maximum good-time
allowance) was also 25.1 months (37.7 times two-thirds). MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N, supra note 99, at 44.

' See Minnesota Dep't of Corrections, Adult Court Commitments (document provided by Mr. Kenneth E. Larimore, Information and Analysis Unit,
Minnesota Department of Corrections) (includes both initial prison commitments and probation revocations); Minnesota Dep't of Corrections, Adults
Returned Without New Sentences (document provided by Mr. Kenneth E.
Larimore, Information and Analysis Unit, Minnesota Department of Corrections) (technical violations of supervised release); MINNESOTA SENTENCING
GUIDELINES COMM'N, supra note 99, at 35 (initial prison commitments).
124 See supra part I.

See MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM*N, SUMMARY OF 1990
SENTENCING PRACTICES FOR CONVICTED FELONS 29-30 (1992) (comparing "new

law" cases sentenced in 1990 with comparable cases sentenced in 1988 and
showing that 1990 prison durations were substantially longer at severity
levels VIII through X).
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mined basic Guidelines goals, 2 ' these changes can also be
viewed as inevitable and even desirable accommodations between the purely retributive model favored by some members
and advisors of the original Commission and the strong utilitarian traditions of judges and other system actors. Minnesota is a
very treatment-oriented state, which also has very strong public
and criminal
justice system support for selective incapacitation
127
goals.
Minnesota and its Guidelines have also not been immune
from popular pressures to escalate prison rates and durations in
response to short-term public hysteria. Although the use of an
independent, nonpolitical sentencing commission did help the
state to resist such pressures during most of the 1980s, the
media-fanned "crime waves" of 1988 and 1991 eventually produced some of the same kinds of penalty increases as have often
occurred in other states. 2 '
Despite these pressures and
severity increases, however, Minnesota is still managing to
avoid the serious problems of prison and jail overcrowding (and
court intervention) which have become the norm in most
states.'2 9 This achievement - which has nothing to do with
the disparity-reduction theme normally associated with determinate sentencing reforms - is perhaps the Minnesota Guidelines' greatest "success story." Whether that success can be

126

PARENT, supra note 2, at 161-66; Miethe & Moore, Four-Year Evalua-

tion, supra note 3, at 5-6; Y. Knapp, Structured Sentencing: Building on
Experience, 72 JUDICATURE 46, 48 (1988).
127 Recent public opinion surveys in Minnesota reveal a widespread
preference for education, job training, community programs, and restitution,
rather than more punishment. See KAY PRANIS & MARK UMBREIT, PUBLIC
OPINION RESEARCH CHALLENGES PERCEPTION OF WIDESPREAD PUBLIC DEMAND
FOR HARSHER PUNISHMENT 2 (1992). Opinion surveys in other states suggest

that Americans support rehabilitative programs as much or more than
punishment. Julian V. Roberts, American Attitudes About Punishment: Myth
and Reality, 3 OVERCROWDED TIMES (No. 2) 1, 10 (1992); MINNESOTA LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, supra note 7, at 80-81.

"2See supra, text accompanying notes 42-54. The 1988 and 1991 "crime
waves" which produced these penalty increases are described in Richard S.
Frase, Prison Population Growing Under Minnesota Guidelines, 4 OVERCROWDED TIMES (no. 1) 1, 10-12 (1993).
12 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRISON CROWDING: ISSUES FACING

THE NATION'S PRISON SYSTEMS 4-5 (1989) ("As of April 1989, 35 states and the
District of Columbia faced court orders and/or consent decrees that related to
prison crowding or the conditions caused by crowding."); see also Table 9 and
supra text accompanying note 114.
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maintained in the years ahead, as the severity increases of the
late 1980s attain their full impact, remains to be seen.
Finally, it appears that the Guidelines have helped Minnesota to make its sentences more uniform and to avoid racial
disparities in the use of prison and jail sentences. But the
present study has shown that racial disparity does exist relative
to the Guidelines Commission's own prescriptive norms: Black
offenders have consistently lower rates of mitigated dispositional departure than Whites; Black and Indian defendants have
generally higher rates of aggravated dispositional departure.
Most of these discrepancies disappear when more variables are
taken into account - but these are variables which the Guidelines themselves define as irrelevant (such as the specific
offense within Guidelines cells, or criminal history score within
presumptive stay or prison-commit groupings). The present
study also reveals that the Guidelines have not eliminated
gender, geographic, and plea-versus-trial disparities.
Many of the conclusions stated above were evident even in
the early post-Guidelines years; they were not fully appreciated,
however, because some of the principal measures of Guidelines
compliance were defective, and critical data needed to compute
proper measures was never collected. For example, mitigated
dispositional departure percentages were dramatically understated (especially for female and white male offenders) because
the percentages were computed on the wrong base; mitigated
departure rates were further understated by the failure to
include de facto departures achieved through charging leniency.
Such departures cannot now be accurately estimated because
the Commission's "real offense" measures were discontinued
after 1984, and never included any estimate of the evidentiary
strength ("provability") of real-offense charges.3 0 In fairness,
it must be pointed out that the Commission was given a massive policy-making and research mandate, and far too little time
and money to carry it out.' 3 ' Nor can earlier researchers be
blamed if they did not recognize problems which seem clearer in
retrospect. The point is simply that future reformers and
130 Similarly, success in reducing disparity among judges cannot be
assessed because judge identification numbers are not included in most of the
Commission's data sets. These data sets also contain almost no information
on the defendant's pretrial detention status, which can have a major impact on
defendant decisions to plead guilty, and on the imposition and duration of jail
sentences. See Frase, supranote 115, at 660-61; Frase, supra note 86, at 237.
131 PARENT, supra note 3, at 32-33 n.5, 97 n.13, 209-10.
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researchers must try to avoid these problems, and must insist
that policy-making and research be fully funded and given
enough time.
Minnesota's Guidelines have never been as philosophically
pure or as dramatically effective as their supporters claimed.
Ironically, this may be good news for reformers elsewhere.
Minnesota is perhaps not so different from other states, after
all - philosophically, politically, and even demographically.
Thus, reformers in other states need not subscribe to a heavily
retributive theory of punishment to adopt Minnesota-style
Guidelines. Minnesota itself did not. Indeed, other states
would do well to avoid attempts to radically shift existing
sentencing purposes and practices, since this has been the least
successful aspect of the Guidelines. Nor should it be assumed
that Minnesota's experience with guidelines sentencing is
irrelevant to states with less of a progressive political tradition,
or with more racial diversity. Recent events in Minnesota
suggest that political pressures on sentencing policy are much
the same everywhere. It is true that Minnesota still has fewer
racial minorities than many other states, but its racial diversity
has increased significantly in recent years - the proportion of
Black defendants among Minnesota felony convictions went
from 11% in 1981 to 20% in 1990, and the total non-White
proportion went from 18% to 29%.132
Thus, when viewed in proper perspective, the Minnesota
Guidelines remain an impressive and achievable model. By
abolishing parole and instituting "real-time" sentencing, the
Guidelines have promoted greater openness and honesty of
punishment. They also appear to have been modestly successful
in achieving and maintaining greater sentencing uniformity,
despite major increases in the ethnic diversity of defendants.
They have been very successful in promoting parsimonious use
of prison sentences, and in preventing prison and jail overcrowding - notwithstanding a 70% increase in the state's felony
caseload during the 1980s. The Minnesota Guidelines control
discretion, but still give judges, prosecutors and attorneys
substantial flexibility to pursue a variety of sentencing purposes
and to tailor sentences to individual cases. They also remain
fairly simple to apply (although not nearly as simple as they
once were). The Legislature has taken back some of its delegat-

132 MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMN, supra note

(Figure 3).

125, at 7
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ed power, but the Guidelines Commission still retains primary
control over the setting of statewide sentencing policy.
Indeed, it appears that all of the declared or apparent goals
of the Minnesota Guidelines have been substantially achieved
and maintained over time, with one exception: the Commission's efforts to effect certain prescriptive changes in the use of
imprisonment were relatively unsuccessful even in the early
years, and became even less successful over time. This finding
contradicts the claims of some writers, who attributed the early
success of the Minnesota Guidelines to their prescriptive (normchanging) approach. 13 3 Instead, Minnesota's experience suggests that descriptive (norm-reinforcing) guidelines, although
less ideologically pure, are more likely to succeed because they
will be more readily accepted by system actors. Such acceptance is critically important; without it, judges, prosecutors, and
correctional officials will use their remaining, unregulated
discretionary powers (in charging, plea bargaining, setting of
probation and supervised release conditions, and revocation of
probation or release) to evade unpopular Guidelines requirements. Such covert evasion invites even greater disparity, and
undercuts the goal of "truth in sentencing" - critical decisions
about the nature and severity of the sentence should be made
openly and honestly."M
Minnesota's experience shows that presumptive sentencing
guidelines can reinforce existing norms and encourage system
actors to follow them more consistently. Such guidelines can
even effect modest changes in existing norms. But any guidelines - whether voluntary, presumptive, or mandatory - are
unlikely to permanently alter state and local traditions and the
strongly-held beliefs of the officials who control sentencing and
releasing decisions.'

" See, e.g., PARENT, supra note 3, at 34-39 (just deserts perspective lent
greater coherence of purpose to Guidelines drafting and implementation); A.
VON HIRSCH ET AL., THE SENTENCING COMMISSION AND ITS GUIDELINES 63
(1987) (expressing approval of the Minnesota Commission's decision to develop
its own policy for sentencing).
1
See supra text accompanying note 7; Frase, supra note 35, at 332.
'a Cf Tonry, supra note 71, at 330 (discussing research on the persistence
of pre-existing norms and traditions, despite reform efforts).

